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ABSTRACT 
  Following Title VII’s enactment, group-based employment 
discrimination actions flourished due to disparate impact theory and 
the class action device. Courts recognized that subordination that 
defined a group’s social identity was also sufficient legally to bind 
members together, even when relief had to be issued individually. 
Woven through these cases was a notion of panethnicity that united 
inherently unrelated groups into a common identity, for example, Asian 
Americans. Stringent judicial interpretation subsequently eroded both 
legal frameworks and it has become increasingly difficult to assert 
collective employment actions, even against discriminatory practices 
affecting an entire group. This deconstruction has immensely 
disadvantaged persons with disabilities. Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA), individual employee claims to accommodate 
specific impairments, such as whether to install ramps or replace 
computer screens, have all but eclipsed a coherent theory of disability-
based disparate impact law. Moreover, the class action device has 
been virtually nonexistent in disability discrimination employment 
cases. The absence of collective action has been especially harmful 
because the realm of the workplace is precisely where group-based 
remedies are needed most. Specifically, a crucial but overlooked issue 
in disability integration is the harder-to-reach embedded norms that 
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require job and policy modifications. The Article argues that 
pandisability theory serves as an analogue to earlier notions of 
panethnicity and provides an equally compelling heuristic for 
determining class identity. It shows that pandisability undergirds 
ADA public service and public accommodation class actions in which 
individualized remedy assessments have been accepted as part of 
group-based challenges to social exclusion. The Article also 
demonstrates that this broader vision of collective action is consistent 
with the history underlying the class action device. Taking advantage 
of the relatively blank slate of writing on group-based disability 
discrimination, it offers an intrepid vision of the ADA’s potential for 
transforming workplace environments. In advocating for a return to 
an earlier paradigm of collective action in the disability context, the 
Article also provides some thoughts on challenging race- and sex-
based discrimination. 
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Future workplace policies should plan for “all jobs to include some 
physical activity” unrelated to job qualifications in order to “dissuade 
unhealthy people from coming to work at Wal-Mart.”1 
 
 1. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Memo Suggests Ways to Cut 
Employee Benefit Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2005, at C1 (publishing a memorandum from Wal-
Mart’s Executive Vice President for Benefits to its Board of Directors). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The period following enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 19642 was a high-water mark in group-based employment 
discrimination theories. In a typical narrative of a Title VII case, an 
individual from a racial or ethnic minority group led a class action 
against a common employer. The class comprised members of her 
own minority group, other minority groups, or sometimes all minority 
groups. Collectively they alleged that employment policies had 
excluded them from workplace opportunities. Not only were 
individuals permitted to proceed as a class and thereby challenge a 
variety of employment policies; they were encouraged to do so. 
Group dynamics were crucial to these cases. Courts recognized 
that, historically, employment practices had harmed entire 
communities of minority workers.3 To ameliorate this situation, 
plaintiff classes were defined by their members’ exclusion. In other 
words, the effects of subordination defined the group and bound its 
members together. This was true even when a class requested relief 
that, due to its variety and scope, was subsequently addressed 
individually rather than communally. Throughout this period, group-
based employment discrimination theories played a crucial role in 
restructuring the workplace. 
Undergirding the definition of group identity for these classes 
was the notion of panethnicity. Panethnicity is a heuristic used by 
mainstream society, including employers and judges, through which 
groups that are not inherently related are treated as having a common, 
overarching identity. Viewing Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, 
and Korean Americans who possess distinct historical, linguistic, and 
cultural norms, as Asian Americans is an example of panethnicity. 
Although the concept is a social construct, post-Title VII cases 
recognized panethnic identities when applying disparate impact theory 
and the class action device. Both of those legal frameworks, however, 
have subsequently been eroded by stringent judicial interpretation; 
Title VII disparate impact cases are now chiefly directed toward a 
single remedial policy, and class certification analysis applies the 
federal pleading requirements of commonality and adequacy in a 
 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2000). 
 3. As noted by the Supreme Court, the purpose of Title VII was to “achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971). 
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manner that constricts group identity. As a result, it has become 
increasingly difficult to predicate collective employment action on a 
unifying group-based identity. This is true even when actions aim to 
enjoin discriminatory practices that the group commonly experiences. 
The deconstruction of group-based theory has immensely 
disadvantaged persons with disabilities. Unlike race- and sex-based 
employment discrimination theories, disability law has not been 
litigated on the basis of group identity. Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA),4 individual claims to accommodate specific 
impairments in particular jobs have all but eclipsed a coherent theory 
of disability-related disparate impact law. Moreover, the class action 
device, which historically played a central role in group-based 
discrimination theory (while often going hand in hand with robust 
disparate impact litigation), has been virtually nonexistent under the 
statute’s employment provisions. We therefore advocate for 
pandisability theory as an appropriate response to the common and 
unifying interest of the disability classification in eradicating common 
subordination, however individually those harms must be resolved. 
Because prejudice and stereotypes arise from misperceptions about 
the characteristics of a class of individuals, it is appropriate and 
effective to pursue classwide solutions. Put most elementarily, we 
argue that group-based discrimination requires group-based action. 
We frame our arguments within the context of a growing debate 
on the efficacy of disparate impact law in light of prevailing 
workplace realities. Commentators agree that for racial minorities 
and for women, success in the working world is contingent on 
eradicating, in turn, facially discriminatory and facially neutral 
policies. After confronting the more obvious forms of discrimination 
through disparate treatment theory, the thrust of employment 
discrimination litigation has been directed at altering workplace 
hierarchies whose bases are harder to discern. Scholars also agree 
that barriers in the modern workplace are more deeply embedded in 
unstated cultural norms and manifest in more nuanced modes of 
discrimination. They sharply divide, however, on whether disparate 
impact theory can alter these latter, subtler norms. A nihilist school 
claims that nothing can be done regarding entrenched workplace 
culture,5 whereas a more optimistic perspective advocates for greater 
 
 4. 42 U.S.C §§ 12101–12213 (2000). 
 5. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006) (averring that disparate treatment and impact 
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use of disparate impact theory.6 Notably, the preceding academic 
conversation (as well as the pertinent case law) has occurred without 
much discussion of the current exclusion or the future potential of a 
disparate impact theory under the ADA.7 This absence, in turn, 
reinforces the erroneous notion that the statute’s individualized 
assessment principle militates against group-based theories. It is this 
lacuna that we address. Taking advantage of the relatively blank slate 
of writing on group-based disability discrimination, we offer an 
intrepid vision of the ADA’s potential for transforming workplace 
environments. 
This Article challenges the exclusion of disability-based 
employment discrimination claims from group-based theories, and in 
so doing advocates for applying disparate impact theory to what have 
heretofore been individualized ADA failure to accommodate claims. 
Although we acknowledge the difficulty of transferring disparate 
impact standards to the disability realm, we also believe that a return 
to earlier notions of group-based rights—in this case expressed 
through the lens of pandisability theory—argues persuasively for 
reinvigorating these areas of law. Recurring juridical dialogue on 
 
models of discrimination are ill-suited to redistribute power and remedy unintentional 
discrimination); Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 
1325–26 (1987) (establishing that Title VII’s disparate impact theory “does not allow for 
challenges to male bias in the structure of business, occupations, or jobs”); Michael Selmi, Was 
the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 738–53 (2006) (arguing that 
disparate impact theory has only proven useful in a limited universe of testing cases); Kathryn 
Abrams, Cross-Dressing in the Master’s Clothes, 109 YALE L.J. 745, 758 (2000) (reviewing JOAN 
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT (2000)) (suggesting that employment discrimination law cannot “actually alter the 
dominant norms of most workplaces or the kinds of roles that men and women play within 
them”); see also Tracy E. Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality, and 
Antidiscrimination Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1194, 1205–07 (2000) (noting the decline of 
disparate impact). 
 6. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Re-Reviving Disparate Impact 59–67 (Seton Hall Pub. 
Law Research Paper No. 9, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=581503 
(commenting on limited ways courts have interpreted disparate impact law, and suggesting a 
“more hopeful future” for disparate impact theory); see also Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and 
Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 666 (2005) (advocating the restructuring of disparate 
impact theory to provide private rights of action based on the realities of work culture); 
Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment Discrimination 
Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 92 (2005) (arguing that, with a different interpretation of 
“workplace essentialism,” Title VII and ADA disparate impact law could have greater impact). 
 7. E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodations, and the 
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 835 (2003) (“For purposes of this 
Article, then, my definition of ‘antidiscrimination law’ is limited to prohibitions on intentional 
discrimination or disparate treatment.”).  
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disability discrimination has focused on individualized physical 
accommodations, as expressed through individual decisions whether 
to place ramps or to replace computer screens; extending a group-
based paradigm to these types of cases would be a positive 
development. The discussion, however, ought not to stop there. A 
prevailing but almost unaddressed issue in disability integration is the 
existence of unstated occupational norms and cultural expectations 
that stymie workplace opportunity for workers with disabilities.8 
Received wisdom asserts that Title VII largely removed the more 
overtly illegitimate race- and sex-based policies from the modern 
workplace, and what remains are legitimate, if unfortunate, barriers 
to disability inclusion. But this conclusion is based on a cramped and 
disability-free view of what disparate impact can and should do. 
Disability-related challenges to the modern workplace, as expressed 
through a return to an earlier paradigm of disparate impact theory 
and class action law, can help level the playing field and better 
incorporate the members of other protected groups. Thus, although 
we present our arguments within the context of ADA actions, these 
same concepts are relevant to the larger universe of Title VII claims. 
The Article proceeds as follows. By way of background, Part I 
briefly reviews post-Title VII group-based employment 
discrimination theories. Focusing first on disparate impact, it 
describes early challenges to seemingly neutral workplace rules that 
disproportionately affected members of protected classes. Over this 
period, panethnicity was used as a proxy for satisfying the 
requirements of class action certification, particularly the 
commonality and adequacy of representation conditions. 
Subsequently, group-based actions, whether viewed through the lens 
 
 8. To illustrate the difference between facially neutral rules and unwritten cultural norms, 
consider two of the requirements for being a successful law firm summer associate. The formal, 
neutral rules described might include research and writing memoranda, observing depositions 
and trials, and helping to prepare more senior attorneys for oral argument. The first wave of 
disparate impact litigation ensured these sorts of policies did not have a disproportionate effect 
on protected groups. An example of an impermissible “neutral” rule would be a firm that only 
hired students from law schools that admitted a disproportionately low number of minority 
students. Classic disparate impact cases did not, however, reach deeper cultural norms that 
equally govern occupational success. Accordingly, summer associates continue to be judged on 
their ability to interact with members of the law firm and its clients in a “professional manner,” 
to socialize at various events outside the workplace, to provide stimulating conversation (and 
appear interested) at numerous summer associate lunches, and to be perceived of as “team 
players.” Because these sorts of closely assessed job requirements are not formally stated 
requirements, they have proven harder to reach under Title VII disparate impact law.  
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of disparate impact theory or class action procedures, have been 
curtailed by restrictive interpretations of group identity. 
Next, Part II turns to the different trajectory of ADA 
employment law. In the ordinary course of disability employment 
cases, plaintiffs will claim that their employers failed to provide 
requested reasonable accommodations, and thereby discriminated 
against them. Although the prejudice asserted derived from the 
plaintiffs’ membership in the disability classification, the case focuses 
on their particular situations and the specific job alterations 
requested. This circumstance can be understood as a result of the 
ADA defining the denial of a reasonable accommodation as one form 
of prohibited discrimination, as well as its emphasis on individualized 
assessments. Nevertheless, this approach is neither desirable nor 
inevitable: the ADA conceptualizes disability-based discrimination as 
a group-based phenomenon and provides for group-based action. 
Part III advocates for group-based ADA (Title I) employment 
cases. Pandisability theory presents an analogue to earlier notions of 
panethnicity and serves as an equally valid heuristic for determining 
class identity. Class actions have been recognized in both public 
service (Title II) and public accommodation (Title III) suits, even 
when those cases sought individualized remedies. The underlying 
rationale for their certification is that group-based stigma and 
exclusion militates in favor of collective action as an appropriate 
judicial response to classwide harms. This view is consistent with the 
history underlying the class action device. Accordingly, group-based 
actions provide the most fruitful means through which to challenge 
and alter deeply embedded workplace hierarchies and norms. Taking 
advantage of the absence of disparate impact law under the ADA, the 
Article advocates a return to an earlier paradigm of collection action 
in the disability field through pandisability theory. Such an adoption 
provides an exemplar for rethinking the challenges facing Title VII 
race- and sex-based discrimination. 
I.  TITLE VII GROUP-BASED DISCRIMINATION THEORIES 
In the period immediately following Title VII’s enactment, 
courts were receptive to group-based discrimination theories. Racial 
minorities and women challenged policies and practices that had the 
effect, if not the intent, of historically excluding them from 
employment opportunity. By liberally construing disparate impact 
law and class certification standards, courts condoned and even 
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encouraged these groups to challenge practices that had precluded 
their occupational participation. 
A. Disparate Impact Theory 
The prevailing framework for analyzing employment-based 
discrimination divides employers’ discriminatory actions by motive. If 
the discriminatory action is alleged to be intentional (whether 
systemically or against an individual), then the analysis proceeds to 
look at the effects of “disparate treatment.”9 When a prejudicial act is 
based on seemingly neutral policies that have a disproportionately 
negative effect upon individuals in protected classes, courts are asked 
to examine the legitimacy of the policies causing that “disparate 
impact.”10 Both theories permit the use of group-based evidence to 
aver the exclusion of protected group members; this is especially true 
for disparate impact claims, in which statistical evidence can create a 
strong presumption of discrimination even in the absence of actual 
proof of motive. 
The difference between these doctrines can be illustrated by 
comparing two seminal Supreme Court decisions. In International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,11 the Court found that the 
plaintiffs had proven their prima facie claims of intentional 
discrimination with respect to the union’s practices regarding the 
hiring and promotion of African Americans.12 One fact that was 
especially probative of intentional discrimination was the absolute 
lack of African American line truck drivers at the time of litigation.13 
The Court found this absence to be the direct result of a policy 
through which people of color were systematically excluded from 
 
 9. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (finding a discriminatory motive 
critical to a claim of disparate treatment). 
 10. One litmus test of whether an employer’s action manifests into one that is properly 
remedied through disparate impact analysis is that banning the seemingly neutral rule will have 
a differential impact upon a protected group. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment 
Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 259–62 (1971) (setting forth justifications for a “blanket ban” on 
race-based differential wage structures). For an overview of disparate impact’s evolution, see 
generally George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of 
Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297 (1987). 
 11. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
 12. Id. at 336–37. Ultimately, the evidence presented included “over 40 specific instances of 
discrimination.” Id. at 338. 
 13. Id. at 337. 
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employment opportunities left open to white employees.14 By 
contrast, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.15 established that an employer 
may violate Title VII without intentionally discriminating against 
members of protected groups, even in the pursuit of laudatory 
policies.16 In Griggs, the employer required a high school education or 
the passing of certain tests to work in the more desirable sectors of its 
work force, and funded employees’ participation in relevant 
educational programs.17 The Court held that as a result of those 
employment policies disproportionately excluding African Americans 
from employment opportunities, Duke Power had violated Title VII.18 
Central to the opinion was the ruling that the focus in a disparate 
impact case is on “the consequences of employment practices, not 
simply the motivation.”19 Because disability-based exclusion arises 
from subtle forms of exclusion and stigma that fall within the 
province of disparate impact theory, our focus is on that doctrine.20 
The Griggs interpretation of disparate impact theory is most 
commonly used in situations in which it is difficult or even impossible 
to prove motive.21 Under Griggs, plaintiffs could assert that, despite a 
lack of concrete evidence of discriminatory intention, statistically 
sustainable circumstantial evidence still pointed to something “wrong 
with the picture” of defendant’s employment practices.22 For example, 
in Griggs, plaintiffs offered evidence that 34 percent of white males in 
North Carolina, but only 12 percent of black males, had completed 
 
 14. Id. Hence, disparate treatment exists in circumstances where an “employer simply 
treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical.” Id. at 335 n.15. 
 15. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 16. Id. at 432. 
 17. Id. at 427–32. 
 18. Id. at 430, 432. 
 19. Id. at 432. 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. It was (further) codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) 
(“An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this 
subchapter only if . . . a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job 
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity . . . .”). 
 22. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 247–51, 366–73 (6th ed. 2003) (discussing statistical proof in disparate impact 
cases); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY 
IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 78–81 (2001) (same for class action disparate impact litigation); see 
also DAVID BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1989). 
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high school.23 Although the lower court had found that the employer 
did not engage in intentional discrimination, the Supreme Court held 
that these statistics proved a disparate impact, and the high school 
requirement was held to violate Title VII.24 
B. Panethnicity and Class Actions 
By its nature, disparate impact theory is group based and 
provides plaintiffs the means by which to challenge demographic 
snapshots of their respective employment situations. Stated plainly, 
plaintiffs allege that due to discriminatory policies or practices, there 
are no (or proportionately not enough) other employees of the same 
race or sex as themselves. In Griggs, for example, plaintiffs argued 
that their employer used a high school graduation requirement as a 
proxy that correlated with race, and in doing so excluded African 
Americans.25 Because disparate impact focuses on groups, it was 
natural that the post-Title VII period saw the theory go hand in hand 
with another juridical recognition of group identity, the class action 
device.26 
Panethnicity was interwoven throughout both disparate impact 
and class action law during this time frame. Developed by social 
scientists, panethnicity describes the heuristic processes through which 
ethnic minority groups that might internally consider themselves 
heterogeneous are externally perceived by the nongroup majority as 
homogeneous.27 Thus, even if the African-American class in Griggs was 
 
 23. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 n.6. 
 24. Id. at 428, 435. 
 25. Id. at 428–29. 
 26. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982) (“[R]acial discrimination is 
by definition class discrimination.”); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 
405 (1977) (“[S]uits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature class 
suits, involving classwide wrongs.”); see also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 
(7th Cir. 1969) (“A suit for violation of Title VII is necessarily a class action as the evil sought to 
be ended is discrimination on the basis of a class characteristic.”). 
 27. See generally YEN LE ESPIRITU, ASIAN AMERICAN PANETHNICITY: BRIDGING 
INSTITUTIONS AND IDENTITIES (1992) (discussing the construction of pan-Asian ethnicity by 
accounting for heterogeneities among this population); Jeff Chang, Local Knowledge(s): Notes 
on Race Relations, Panethnicity and History in Hawai’i, 22 AMERASIA J. 1 (1996) (describing the 
effects on self-identification on individuals of overlapping multiethnic origins); Jose Itzigsohn & 
Carlos Dore-Cabral, Competing Identities? Race, Ethnicity and Panethnicity Among Dominicans 
in the United Status, 15 SOC. FORUM 225 (2000) (exploring the intersection of national identity 
and Hispanic/Latino identity among one group of American immigrants); David Lopez & Yen 
Le Espiritu, Panethnicity in the United States: A Theoretical Framework, 13 ETHNIC & RACIAL 
STUD. 198 (1990) (offering thoughts on how to approach a then-relatively new discipline). 
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diverse in terms of economic status or other factors, the members 
formed a cohesive unit for the purpose of antidiscrimination litigation. 
Because employers historically used race-based proxies to exclude 
African Americans as a group from the workplace, it was deemed 
equitable also to allow them to proceed as a community when 
challenging those practices.28 
At its core, the class action device allows a group of individuals 
who have a similar claim as the named plaintiff communally to seek 
relief. For certification purposes, a putative class must show (amongst 
other things) that there are questions of law or fact common to the class, 
that the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of 
the claims or defenses of the class, and that the representative will fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class.29 These requirements 
are often referred to, respectively, as commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy.30 During the period following Title VII’s enactment, courts 
adopted a flexible approach to these Rule 23 requirements,31 routinely 
certifying “across-the-board” classes.32 This meant that courts allowed a 
plaintiff who was a member of a protected class to represent all 
members of that class in their various and different employment 
 
 28. For recent work on the internal, and often conflicting diversity within African 
American civil rights communities, see generally Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social 
Movements, and the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005), and 
Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race As Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the 
Salience of Intra-Racial Conflict, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (2003). 
 29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 30. See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 1763, 1764, 1765, 1771 (3d ed. 2005). 
 31. For a discussion of this “flexibility,” see Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination 
Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 818 (2004). See also Charles Mishkind et al., The 
Big Risks: Class Actions and Pattern and Practice Cases, 591 PUB. L. INST. 329, 338 (1998) 
(“Prior to 1977, employment discrimination lawsuits were routinely certified as class actions 
based on the rationale that such claims were inherently of a class nature, and presumptively 
appropriate for class certification.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Gibson v. Local 40, Int’l Longshoreman’s and Warehouseman’s Union, 543 
F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that a class may maintain claims of generalized 
discrimination even though discrimination manifested itself in various ways toward different 
class members); Crockett v. Green, 534 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that class action 
status is particularly appropriate in cases involving group discrimination); Senter v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that race discrimination is class discrimination); 
Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 340 (10th Cir. 1975) (holding that although it may 
appear as if named plaintiffs have not suffered discrimination, this does not prevent them from 
representing the class); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 548 n.5 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding 
that even if a named plaintiff’s claim is denied, a class action may still be appropriate); Reed v. 
Arlington Hotel Co., 476 F.2d 721, 723 (8th Cir. 1973) (noting the parallels between Title VII 
and class actions). 
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relationships with a common employer. A Mexican-American worker 
who had been denied a promotion allegedly on the basis of race, for 
example, could represent other Mexican Americans who had not been 
hired. This was viewed as the most practical and efficient way of 
challenging discrimination, for it allowed a “broad, rather than . . . 
piecemeal, attack upon discriminatory employment practices.”33 
Although the members of the class might be diverse in their relationship 
to their employer, the class was bound together by the common 
experience of discrimination.34 
Courts also allowed members of one racial minority to represent 
other racial minorities. For example, in Sanchez v. Standard Brands, 
Inc.,35 the court held that a Mexican-American plaintiff had standing to 
challenge employment discrimination on behalf of a class of present and 
future Mexican-American and African-American employees of the 
defendant.36 Similarly, in Harvey v. International Harvester Co.,37 the 
court held that an African-American plaintiff could represent a class of 
“all minority groups” that alleged discrimination.38 And in Ellis v. Naval 
Air Rework Facility,39 the court held that named plaintiffs who were 
African American and Mexican American could represent a class of all 
minority workers.40 Courts also held that African-American plaintiffs 
alone could also represent Mexican Americans,41 people with Spanish 
 
 33. McLendon v. M. David Lowe Pers. Servs., Inc., No. 75-H-1185, 1977 WL 15, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 29, 1977); see id. (“[T]his Court must reject the thesis that a named plaintiff must have 
been the victim of the entire gamut of ways in which a policy of racial discrimination is 
manifested by an employer. To hold otherwise would be to burden the Courts with a 
multiplicity of suits involving piecemeal adjudication of discrimination claims as to each 
employer. This would be plainly an inefficient method of implementing the policies of Title 
VII.”). 
 34. See Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969) (“While it is 
true, as the lower court points out, that there are different factual questions with regard to 
different employees, it is also true that the ‘Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy 
hangs over the racial class [and] is a question of fact common to all members of the class.’” 
(quoting Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184, 186 (D. Tenn. 1966))). 
 35. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1970). 
 36. Id. at 459. 
 37. Harvey v. Int’l Harvester Co., 56 F.R.D. 47 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
 38. Id. at 48. 
 39. Ellis v. Naval Air Rework Facility, 404 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
 40. Id. at 396–97. 
 41. E.g., Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1239, 1240 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1970); McLendon v. 
M. David Lowe Pers. Servs., Inc., No. 75-H-1185, 1977 WL 15, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 1977); 
Nat’l Org. of Women v. Bank of Cal., No. C-72-441, 1972 WL 246, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 
1972). 
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surnames,42 Native Americans,43 and Asian Americans.44 In these cases, 
courts consistently found that cross-minority representation did not 
defeat adequacy of representation, and that claims made by one 
minority could be typical of other minorities because the alleged 
discrimination bound their interests together.45 This flexible approach to 
class certification countenanced a judicial recognition of the need and 
desirability of group-driven litigation challenging policies and practices 
that favored the traditional labor force of white male employees.46 
Classes that were defined this broadly—in some cases, so broadly 
that they represented all minorities47—were grounded in the idea that a 
key issue for courts to tap into was the way that the traditional in-group 
labor force perceives the newly emerging workforce.48 Whether 
intentionally or not, this notion was undergirded by the concept of 
panethnicity. To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical: thirty-
four Latina Americans file a racial and sexual discrimination suit 
under Title VII against Big Impersonal Corporation, claiming illegal 
 
 42. Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F. Supp. 1377, 1396–97 (N.D. Cal. 1987); see 
also Jones v. Milwaukee County, 68 F.R.D. 638, 640 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 
 43. E.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 317 (8th Cir. 1971); see also Jones v. Milwaukee 
County, 68 F.R.D. 638, 640 (E.D. Wis. 1975). 
 44. E.g., Ellis, 404 F. Supp. at 396–97. 
 45. See McLendon, 1977 WL 15, at *2–4 (“Although the named plaintiffs in these actions 
are of Black and Chicano ancestry . . . they can adequately represent the claims of a broad 
spectrum of minority workers . . . .”); Jones, 68 F.R.D. at 640 (“Black plaintiffs are not 
precluded from representing a class in a Title VII action which contains persons of other 
minority racial and ethnic groups.”). 
 46. In Penn v. Stumpf, for example, plaintiff alleged that the Oakland Police Department 
had discriminated against African Americans, Mexican Americans, and Spanish surnamed 
people. 308 F. Supp. at 1239. He further argued that the defendant did not take into account the 
cultural differences of non-Caucasian communities in their testing, interview, and background 
investigation procedures. The case was allowed to proceed as a class action despite the fact that the 
named plaintiff was an African American who represented members of two other ethnic groups, 
and had not progressed beyond the testing phase of the application process (hence, he could not yet 
have been discriminated against in interviewing and background investigations). Id. at 1242, 1239, 
1240 & n.1. The lawsuit thus triggered a broader discussion of how the Oakland Police Department 
had (albeit unintentionally) created a working environment that catered to and maintained the 
“traditional” workforce to the exclusion of new members. Id. at 1242. 
 47. See, e.g., Carter, 452 F.2d at 317. 
 48. Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F. Supp. 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1987), provides a 
clear example. Defendant trash company was started by persons of Italian ancestry, who “[b]y 
virtue of hard work and good management” created an expansive and prosperous business. Id. 
at 1381. As the enterprise grew, the original owners needed additional staffing, and “hired other 
ethnic minorities at the bottom of the economic ladder, Blacks and Hispanics.” Id. These “new” 
minorities claimed that defendants were not sharing the higher-level opportunities in the 
enterprise with them. Id. at 1381, 1383–85. 
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employment practices.49 Of the women comprising the class, thirty are 
American-born (of whom ten are of Puerto Rican descent, eight are 
of Mexican origin, six are of Chilean descent, five trace their origins 
to Spain, and one to Peru), two were born in Cuba, one in Mexico, 
and one in the Dominican Republic. Twenty of the women are 
currently employed as administrative assistants, ten as vice presidents, 
two are word processors, and two are secretaries. Twenty-four hold 
university degrees, twenty-two speak Spanish in varying amounts, 
nineteen have dark complexions, seventeen are from affluent 
backgrounds, and one is openly lesbian.50 
Although these individuals are clearly diverse (and because of 
that diversity, perhaps at odds with one another in other contexts),51 
the fact that they are all “Latinas” or “female Hispanics” allows the 
social majority to treat them as a single group.52 We argue in Part III 
that a parallel construction of “pandisability” is a useful theoretical 
construct for linking the interests of individuals with diverse disabilities 
for disparate impact and class action purposes. 
C. Judicial Erosion of Collective Action 
Group-based statistical evidence regarding disparate impact, 
combined with liberal class certification standards, contributed to the 
post-Title VII era being an exemplar of judicial acceptance of group-
based discrimination theories. Courts focused on the socially imposed 
 
 49. We return to this hypothetical, infra text accompanying notes 178–79, to expand the 
reasons for suit. 
 50. See generally W. Christopher Arbery, The Threat of Employment Class Actions Hovers: 
Companies Need Not Be Always in a Defensive Position on Such Cases, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 13, 
2003, at C24 (describing the diversity within a “typical” race-based class action). 
 51. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Lawrence Friedman offers the following 
argument in the context of the construct of “Asian Americans” which applies equally to other 
groups: 
The people who collectively are called Asian-American certainly did not cohere in 
any meaningful way in Asia itself. Indeed, some of the groups . . . roundly hated each 
other back home. In Asia, there was no pan-Asian sense among Koreans, Japanese, 
and Chinese; to the contrary, they were historic enemies. And any notion that they 
had anything in common with Samoans or Cambodians would have struck them as 
bizarre. 
LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL SOCIETY 103 (1999). 
 52. For an articulation of diversity within the Latina/o community through a LatCrit 
perspective, see generally Symposium, Rotating Centers, Expanding Frontiers: LatCrit Theory 
and Marginal Intersections, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 751 (2000); Symposium, Comparative 
Latinas/os: Identity, Law and Policy in LatCrit Theory, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 575 (1999); 
Symposium, LatCrit Theory: Naming and Launching a New Discourse of Critical Legal 
Scholarship, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1 (1997). 
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views of minority groups, as reinforced by panethnicity, and allowed this 
common heuristic to bind groups together for litigation purposes. Over 
time, however, a fundamental shift has taken place in the way that 
courts view group-based action. Rather than being attentive to the 
cultural connections that tie groups together for litigation purposes, 
courts became focused on intragroup differences, and in particular on 
the specific relief individuals requested. As remedies became 
increasingly viewed as more individualized, group-based discrimination 
theories were cut back. 
This change was perhaps most dramatic within disparate impact 
law. As applied in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,53 and later 
codified in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,54 a plaintiff must show that a 
particular employment practice, used by the employer, creates the 
disparate impact.55 In this way, Title VII disparate impact law is 
tethered to specific acts of discrimination, which by and large 
precludes a discussion of deeper structural relationships—despite the 
contrary wishes of commentators,56 as well as some legislators.57 In 
Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co.,58 for example, a class of African 
 
 53. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 54. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000)). 
 55. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656; 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A)–(B) (2000). The statute does 
permit the decision-making process to be analyzed as one employment practice when the 
plaintiff can prove that “the elements of [an employer’s] decision making process are not 
capable of separation for analysis.” § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). Despite this, many commentators 
dismiss this statutory provision as neither widely used nor effective. See Sullivan, supra note 6, 
at 54–55 (discussing specific cases where courts struggled to find disparate impact “in instances 
in which it is not clear what, if any, employer practice causes a particular bad bottom line”); see 
also Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We doubt that the overall screening 
process should be treated as one employment practice for purposes of disparate impact 
analysis.”); Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 13 (“[T]hat burden has proven difficult for employees to 
sustain as many decisionmaking processes can plausibly be separated into constituent 
elements.”). 
 56. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 13–14 (“These features of disparate impact doctrine 
make it a poor tool for addressing discrimination that does its work through an accumulation of 
small, repeated instances of biased perception and evaluation.”); see also Green, supra note 6, at 
654–58 (explaining how the disparate impact theory “falls short” because of the doctrine’s 
difficulties in “addressing work culture as a source of discrimination”). 
 57. In 1963, Senator Hubert Humphrey testified that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should 
respond to the “many impersonal institutional processes which nevertheless determine the 
availability of jobs for nonwhite workers.” William E. Forbath, Civil Rights and Economic 
Citizenship: Notes on the Past and Future of the Civil Rights and Labor Movements, 2 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 697, 713 (2000) (quoting Senator Hubert Humphrey, testifying in 1963 before 
the Senate Labor Committee). 
 58. Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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Americans contended that the defendant employer discriminated 
against them in hiring and promotion on the basis of their race.59 In 
support of this assertion, plaintiffs pointed to a number of factors 
including policies requiring individuals to fill out applications in person, 
failing to post promotion opportunities, lacking written criteria, and 
giving certain employees temporary upgrades to promotion spots.60 
Citing Wards Cove, the court held that plaintiffs could not avail 
themselves of the disparate impact theory because they “merely 
launched a wide-ranging attack on the cumulative effects” of the 
defendant’s policies rather than “isolating and identifying the specific 
employment practices” that created specific inequities.61 
Anderson and other cases like it stand for the proposition that 
courts will be fairly rigid in policing the requirement that plaintiffs argue 
an objective, rather than circumstantial, causal connection between a 
specific employment practice and a specific disparate impact. Claims 
that subtle, intertwined, and hard-to-detect factors combine to keep 
minorities from the workforce will preclude use of the disparate impact 
proof structure. Thus, in EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab,62 the fact that a 
restaurant was almost completely devoid of female waiting staff, despite 
large numbers of women in the relevant labor market, was held 
inadequate to the task of proving discrimination.63 Although plaintiffs 
struggled to point out an official policy or practice that caused these low 
numbers, the best they could come up with was that defendants 
maintained an “old world” atmosphere. The Eleventh Circuit declined 
to find that this was an “employment practice” within the province of 
disparate impact.64 Courts also have held that mere employer 
 
 59. Id. at 1281. 
 60. Id. at 1282–83. 
 61. Id. at 1284. 
 62. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 63. Id. at 1276. 
 64. Id. at 1278. The court did remand, however, on whether this was sufficient evidence of 
systemic disparate treatment. Id. at 1268. For discussion of the implications of this case for 
disparate impact sex discrimination claims, see L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of 
Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 366–67 (2005). See also 
Nicole J. DeSario, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact 
Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 479, 505–07 (2003) (stating how the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Joe’s Stone Crab demonstrates how “the standards of identification and 
causation codified in [the Civil Rights Act of 1991] can be insurmountable barriers to 
establishing a prima facie case”); Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling?, 25 HARV. WOMEN’S 
L.J. 1, 13–14 (2002) (discussing Joe’s Stone Crab and how those circumstances indicate that 
“[w]omen are prevented by discrimination from attaining positions that are higher level, and 
pay more, than the ones they have traditionally occupied”); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private 
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“passivity” in light of disparate circumstances is insufficient to prove 
discrimination. Instead, the challenged policy or practice must have 
been “actively” adopted.65 
This sea change away from group-based discrimination claims had 
started even earlier, within the realm of class action law. In General 
Telephone Co. v. Falcon,66 the Supreme Court tightened the reins on 
class certification standards. Criticizing “across-the-board” classes, the 
Court held that the general proposition that “racial discrimination is by 
definition class discrimination,” though perhaps true, did not mean that 
an allegation of racial discrimination necessarily satisfied all of Rule 23’s 
requirements.67 Rather, named class representatives had to demonstrate 
a greater unanimity of interest with the proposed class. After Falcon, 
courts have held that plaintiffs who suffered discrimination in hiring 
may not represent plaintiffs who were discriminated against in 
promotion decisions, and vice versa. The doctrinal pleading basis for 
limiting class representation was that these forms of representation did 
not rise to the level of typicality or adequacy of representation required 
by the federal rules.68 
Although Falcon has been criticized for creating a cramped view 
of group identity,69 it was not completely revolutionary. Even during 
 
Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 
188–89 (2004) (describing how “[t]he slippery slope created by permitting employers to make 
hiring decisions based on sex-specific soft characteristics poses serious group-based equality-of-
opportunity dangers”). 
 65. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that an employer’s word of mouth recruiting was a form of “passive reliance” and not an 
employer policy for purposes of disparate impact analysis, despite arguments by the EEOC that 
passive reliance had caused a disparate impact on blacks). 
 66. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
 67. Id. at 157; see E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405–06 (1977) 
(“We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very 
nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions of law and fact are typically 
present. But careful attention to the requirements of Fed. Rule Civ Proc. 23 remains 
nonetheless indispensable.”). 
 68. See Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1493 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that a class could 
not be certified when one representative complained promotion practices were discriminatory 
and another alleged the qualification exam was discriminatory); see also Wagner v. Taylor, 836 
F.2d 578, 595–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding supervisors are not in same class as non-supervisors 
because they may have conflicting interests); Roby v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 775 F.2d 959, 
962 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that employees could not represent a class of individuals affected by 
the railroad’s promotion policies or those who were discharged for violating company rules 
because the employees’ complaint did not derive from either of these circumstances). 
 69. See Hart, supra note 31, at 819–20 (“In the years after the Court emphasized the 
importance of adherence to the requirements of Rule 23, the number of class action suits filed in 
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the height of judicial acceptance of group-based discrimination 
theories, a limited number of cases had restricted the ability of 
internally heterogeneous groups to use the class action device.70 For 
example, in Pagan v. DuBois,71 a proposed class of Latino inmates 
challenged a lack of Spanish-speaking prison staff and Latino cultural 
programs.72 Denying certification, the court reasoned that the 
designation “Latino” was “too general to be useful in formulating the 
specific judicial remedy sought here,” and also created intraclass 
conflicts that precluded adequate representation.73 The court thus 
attached greater importance to intragroup differences than plaintiffs’ 
allegations that the defendant viewed plaintiffs as a homogenous group 
of Latinos. As we discuss in Part III, it is this view of class certification 
that has carried over to disability discrimination cases, namely, that 
perceived differences within the group are considered more salient than 
the common umbrella of alleged discrimination, and, as a consequence, 
classes are rarely certified.74 
This conspicuous refusal to accept group claims on the basis of 
common, though socially imposed, identities has similarly restricted the 
efficacy of group-based ADA employment discrimination claims. As 
 
federal court decreased significantly.”); see also Scotty Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action 
Lawsuit in Employment Discrimination Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 
Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 925, 935 (2001) 
(indicating that Falcon ended widespread certification of across-the-board class actions in 
discrimination lawsuits because “[i]t was no longer sufficient for one plaintiff, represented by 
one law firm, to allege across-the-board discrimination”); John A. Tisdale, Deterred 
Nonapplicants in Title VII Class Actions: Examining the Limits of Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 151, 171 (1984) (“The case signals an end to the procedural 
favoritism often granted Title VII plaintiffs by the federal courts and effectively rejects the 
across-the-board concept of class certification.”). 
 70. The court in Black Grievance Committee v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 79 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978), for instance, held it was “clear that black plaintiffs possess the same interest and suffer 
the same injury as only the black class members who experienced the alleged racial 
discrimination,” but “do not share the same interest as Spanish-surnamed [workers] who have 
allegedly suffered discrimination on the basis of national origin,” id. at 110. 
 71. Pagan v. DuBois, 884 F. Supp. 25 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 72. Id. at 26. 
 73. To quote the court at length: 
Latin-America is a continent comprised of many countries consisting of people of 
many races and ethnic origins. There is a potential conflict within the proposed 
Latino class between Latinos who are citizens of Brazil, for example, and Latinos who 
are citizens of the United States . . . and between Latinos whose culture derives from 
Africa and those whose culture derives from Western Europe . . . . What Latino 
culture is to be taught and celebrated? 
Id. at 28. 
 74. See infra Part II.B. 
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shown in the next Part, rather than focusing on common membership in 
the disability classification, courts and commentators have dwelt on 
internal differences within the class, and in particular on what they 
perceive to be inherently individualized requests for relief. This, in turn, 
has limited the ability of people with disabilities to challenge workplace 
barriers that persist in keeping them as a group out of the workforce. 
II.  THE ORDINARY COURSE OF ADA CLAIMS 
The early development of ADA Title I has followed a different 
path than its conceptual predecessor, Title VII. Whereas the period 
following the Civil Rights Act of 1964 embraced group-based 
discrimination theories, disability-based employment suits have 
proceeded almost entirely on an individualized basis.75 In doing so, 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence has missed a crucial opportunity for 
developing ADA principles. 
A. Failure to Accommodate 
Cases under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and 
especially plaintiffs’ claims for reasonable accommodations, have 
developed as the antithesis of collective action. The dominant theme 
of these ADA cases has been an almost exclusive focus on an 
individual plaintiff’s particular circumstances and the specific 
accommodation that was requested. Yet many of the entrenched 
barriers keeping people with disabilities out of the workplace are a 
result of prejudice and neglect (rather than outright animus) that 
derive from membership in the disability classification. Further, these 
barriers can affect a wide range of disabilities beyond the specific 
individual in question.76 
The ADA defines employment discrimination to include “not 
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
 
 75. However, it bears noting that ADA litigation is encumbered by the same selection bias 
that affects Title VII suits. Because plaintiffs’ lawyers typically operate on a contingency fee 
basis, they prefer discharge cases, especially ones involving well remunerated employees. John 
J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991) (citing a study that found that 80 percent of wrongful 
termination suits in California were filed by workers “who had been terminated for inadequate 
performance” and only 20 percent of workers “lost their jobs due to exogenous economic 
factors”). Hence, plaintiffs who seek to bring failure to hire claims under the ADA are 
relatively unattractive to rational attorneys, as are non-hired Title VII plaintiffs. 
 76. See infra Part II.B. 
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limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” who 
is a job applicant or current employee.77 Reasonable accommodations 
encompass a wide range of adjustments to existing workplace 
conditions, but are mainly conceptualized as falling into one or 
another of two categories. The first category requires the alteration or 
provision of a physical plant.78 An obvious example is ramping a stair 
to accommodate the needs of an employee who uses a wheelchair. 
These types of accommodations involve “hard” costs, meaning that 
they invoke readily quantifiable out-of-pocket expenses.79 
Furthermore, their existence becomes quickly known in the 
workplace; a ramp at the entrance to a store may be welcome but its 
presence is not unobtrusive. The second type of accommodation 
involves an alteration of the way in which a job is performed, or the 
criteria for obtaining that job.80 Examples of this latter form of 
accommodation include dispensing a wheelchair-using store 
employee from having to stack high shelves, or eliminating eye 
examinations as job criteria for psychologists, some of whom may be 
visually impaired. These accommodations bring into play “soft” costs, 
which are more difficult to quantify.81 Soft-cost accommodations are 
harder to discern: there is no reason to know that a coworker is off 
administering an insulin injection rather than having a bathroom 
break, or that an employee was not subjected to a Rorschach ink blot 
test because some persons with cerebral palsy cannot perceive the 
depth of the diagrams.82 
Failure to accommodate cases typically proceed in a highly 
atomistic way, with individual claimants requesting what they deem as 
a reasonable (hard- or soft-cost) accommodation that will enable 
 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). Seven other forms of conduct defined as 
discriminatory are set forth in this provision. We return to the broader, more ecumenical ones, 
infra text accompanying notes 112–16. 
 78. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A) (2000) (requiring an employer to make “existing facilities used 
by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities”). 
 79. Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1671, 1677–81 
(2000). 
 80. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (allowing job restructuring or modification, variation in 
existing methods of administration, and the provision of readers or interpreters). 
 81. Stein, supra note 79, at 1677. 
 82. See generally STEDMAN’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1301 (27th ed. 2000) (listing 
symptoms of cerebral palsy). 
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them to perform the essential functions of a particular job.83 Should 
the employer decline the accommodation request as part of the 
“interactive process,”84 the aggrieved workers may file a complaint 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).85 In 
the event that parties cannot resolve their differences, plaintiffs can 
file suits asserting that the denial of their individual accommodation 
requests violates the ADA’s mandates.86 If the trial court finds a 
requested accommodation to be reasonable,87 then that 
accommodation is provided, and the specific workplace policy is 
altered for an individual.88 Wholly absent from this emblematic 
account is a discussion of whether other individuals with disabilities 
might be impacted by the provision of this accommodation.89 
 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Statutory protection also extends to disabled workers capable of 
performing essential job functions without provision of reasonable accommodations, id., but 
those individuals are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 84. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(3), 1630.9 (2006). One would think that profit-maximizing 
employers acting in their own self-interest would have already expended resources to figure out the 
“real costs,” including positive and negative externalities, of employing disabled workers. That they 
fail to do so suggests a market failure. See Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality, and 
Workers with Disabilities, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000); see also Sharon Hartman 
& Pamela M. Robert, The Social Construction of Disability in Organizations: Why Employers 
Resist Reasonable Accommodation, 25 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 397 (1998) (concluding that 
although employers frame their resistance to providing accommodations in terms of economics, 
their real motivation is to maintain hierarchical control of the workplace and the way it is 
organized). 
 85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (2000); see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.6–1601.8 (2006) (establishing the 
guidelines for this process). At this point, either the employer or the employee can request 
mediation of their differences, which the ADA does not require, but strongly advises. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12212 (2000). In a self-evaluation, the EEOC found the process to be effective. See E. 
PATRICK MCDERMOTT ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION MEDIATION PROGRAM (2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/summary. 
html (last visited Oct. 15, 2006) (finding “a high degree of participant satisfaction with the 
EEOC mediation program”). 
 86. Other claims beyond failure to accommodate can also be alleged, for instance, 
disability harassment. See Holland M. Tahvonen, Disability-Based Harassment: Standing and 
Standards for a “New” Cause of Action, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1494–95 (2003) 
(“[D]isability harassment as a cause of action is modeled after the Title VII harassment claim.”). 
 87. Although the reasonable accommodation mandate is fundamental to disability-based 
employment discrimination, neither the ADA nor interpreting courts have provided much 
guidance on how to determine the reasonableness of accommodations. For an initial, hopefully 
useful, economic framework, see generally Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of 
Disability Accommodations, 53 DUKE L.J. 79 (2003). 
 88. For a political science perspective on the hierarchy shift this entails, see RUTH 
O’BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT: GENDER, DISABILITY, AND A WORKPLACE ETHIC OF CARE 
(2005). 
 89. According to Richard Epstein, the prospect of having workers with disabilities 
employed by the same firm is a positive event; rather than “handicap ghettoization,” the 
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Similarly, these cases do not delve, either statistically or anecdotally, 
into the employer’s historical or current patterns of accommodating 
(or hiring or promoting) people with disabilities in the workplace.90 
Under this existing model, failure to accommodate claims do not 
consider the possibility of disparate impact theory. To date, published 
federal decisions have not specifically determined a single failure to 
accommodate employment claim under disparate impact analysis.91 The 
Supreme Court decision in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez92 provided a 
notable exception by acknowledging the broad proposition that 
“disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the ADA.”93 Raytheon, 
however, did not involve workplace accommodation, and the Court 
did not elaborate its reasoning as to the viability of disparate impact 
theory in the disability discrimination context.94 Because Raytheon did 
not express an opinion one way or the other on disparate impact being 
 
concentration of workers with disabilities at particular sites increases the likelihood that physical 
plant or equipment accommodations will see repeated usage. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN 
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 480–94 (1992). Similarly, 
J.H. Verkerke argues that employees ideally should be matched with a company capable of 
duplicating accommodations because an economy of scale would ultimately bring down the 
accommodation cost. J.H. Verkerke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 935–37 
(2003). An important point that is tangential to this Article bears noting. When advocating in 
favor of the efficiency of repeated accommodations, Professors Epstein and Verkerke both 
support, by inference, the notion of directed placements, meaning that they favor specific 
vocational placements for workers with disabilities who evidence certain skills. To the extent 
that this policy either limits the development of disabled workers or shunts them into certain 
careers, we very strongly disagree. However, to the extent that such a policy duplicates some of 
the gains made in the past through vocational rehabilitation that afforded recipients job support 
and options, we endorse it. 
 90. See Wendy Wilkerson, Judicially Crafted Barriers to Bringing Suit Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 907, 910–15 (1997). 
 91. Some, however, acknowledge the possibility of disparate impact in dicta when the 
immediate decision is not favorable to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Reichmann v. Cutler-Hammer, 
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1296 (D. Kan. 2001) (questioning, tangentially, the application of 
disparate impact theory to an employment-related medical inquiry). 
 92. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003). 
 93. Id. at 53. 
 94. Raytheon was remanded to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the defendant had 
discriminated against Hernandez on the basis of his disability. Id. at 55. As a former drug user, 
Hernandez fell within the ADA’s aegis. Id. at 50 n.4. Raytheon asserted that it declined to 
rehire the rehabilitated Hernandez because he had violated company rules while under the 
influence of drugs, and hence not (then) disabled. Id. at 48–50, 55. Admittedly, Mr. Hernandez, 
a drug user working for a missile-making defense contractor, id. at 46, does not provoke very 
sympathetic arguments in favor of disparate impact litigation for disabled workers. However, 
putting to the side Mr. Hernandez’s personal circumstances (as well as fears of public injury), 
the dynamic of the rules he challenged can be extrapolated to individuals with disabilities more 
generally. See infra Parts II.B, III. 
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applied to failure to accommodate claims, it should be viewed as a floor, 
not a ceiling, to the type of ADA claims that can be brought under 
disparate impact theory. 
Class action litigation is also notably missing from the realm of 
failure to accommodate cases. Only a handful of disability 
employment-related class actions have been brought. In this limited 
pool of reported cases, denials of class certifications vastly outnumber 
grants of class status. Courts have denied certification to five classes 
containing individuals with a range of disabilities, and their respective 
denials were predicated on the notion that the remedies granted, if 
any, were based on individualized inquiry into disability and the 
accommodation needed, and thus lacked typicality.95 Conversely, two 
classes have been certified which were comprised of individuals with 
the same types of disability (hearing and visual impairments).96 One 
class comprised of two discrete types of disability (diabetes and 
 
 95. See Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 680–81 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming 
the denial of class certification of employees with various forms of repetitive stress disorder); 
Sokol v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., No. C 97-4211 SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20215, at *3–4, 
*14–18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1999) (denying class certification of individuals with various wrist 
and shoulder injuries on the ground that two of the four challenged practices were “inseparable 
from the interactive process of determining reasonable accommodations”); Mandichak v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 94-CV-1071, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23005, at *30–31 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 
1998) (denying, on the ground of lack of typicality, class certification of diversely disabled 
employees asserting defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in denying 
workplace accommodations); Davoll v. Webb, 160 F.R.D. 142, 146 (D. Colo. 1995) (refusing to 
certify a class of injured police officers seeking reassignment to light duty because individualized 
inquiries were needed to determine disability of plaintiffs); Lintemuth v. Saturn Corp., No. 1:93-
0211, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18601, at *1–15 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 1994) (magistrate report and 
recommendation) (eschewing class certification of individuals with carpal tunnel syndrome 
and/or nerve ailments on the basis that individualizing inquiry necessarily failed the typicality 
requirement), enforced, No. 1-93-0211, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17379 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 31, 
1994); see also Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2000) (precluding a suit 
by flight attendants for discrimination based on maximum weight requirements on several 
grounds, including that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a causal connection between alleged 
eating disorders and the contested policy); Schroedel v. N.Y. Univ. Med. Ctr., 885 F. Supp. 594, 
597–600 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying certification of class action of hearing impaired people for 
emergency room sign language interpreters on the ground that the named plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate a likelihood of needing such service in future). 
 96. See Bates v. UPS, 204 F.R.D. 440, 449 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (certifying a class of employees 
who “‘use sign language as a primary means of communication due to a hearing loss or 
limitation’” (quoting Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification)); Wilson v. Pa. State Police 
Dep’t, No. 94-CV-6547, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9981, at *1–12 (E.D. Pa. July 14, 1995) 
(certifying challenge by individuals with correctable visual impairments under both Title I and 
the Rehabilitation Act). 
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epilepsy) has been certified,97 as has one class motion granted for 
individuals with a variety of disabilities seriously injured in a hog 
slaughtering plant (including individuals with various workplace 
injuries that created permanent workplace restrictions).98 When these 
suits are certified as class actions it is either the wholesale exclusion of 
diversely disabled people, or the specific exclusion of a homogeneous 
group of disabled people, that forms a sufficiently unifying theme to 
pass Rule 23 muster.99 
With non-disability discrimination, class action litigation has 
played a central role in systemic challenges to employment 
exclusion.100 This is especially true when actions are brought as part of 
a program of vigorous public implementation.101 Public enforcement 
authorities like the Department of Justice and the EEOC that 
extensively litigate employment class action cases under Title VII,102 
 
 97. See EEOC v. Nw. Airlines, 216 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937–38 (D. Minn. 2002) (certifying a 
class of anti-seizure medicated epileptics and insulin-dependant diabetics who were denied 
positions as cleaners or equipment service employees). 
 98. See Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 687, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(reporting, and not reversing, the district court’s certification of a class of “former production 
workers . . . who were injured on the job and placed on medical layoff after they received 
permanent medical restrictions that precluded them from performing their regular jobs and any 
other available production jobs at the plant”). 
 99. Thus, the court in Bates reasoned that the entire class sought “to remedy policies and 
practices at UPS that allegedly discriminate illegally against the hearing disabled.” 204 F.R.D. at 
447. 
 100. On the role that class actions play in employment discrimination as a means and 
incentive toward changing business practices through combining statistical evidence and proof, 
see Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law By Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the 
Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 914–29 (discussing the 
transformative effect of class action litigation). 
 101. See Drew S. Days, III, “Feedback Loop”: The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Progeny, 
49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 981, 987–88 (2005) (suggesting that forceful and prompt enforcement of 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was crucial to its success in creating social change); see 
also U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT 10 
(1971) (“Within a few months after enactment, the Department . . . brought several 
enforcement actions that tested the constitutionality of the public accommodations law.”). 
 102. For example, the analysis of one Nobel prize winning economist and three of his 
colleagues indicates that it was protracted governmental enforcement of Title VII that had the 
greatest effect on narrowing the race-based wage gap in the South. John J. Donohue III & 
James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the 
Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1605 (1991) (“When all aspects of 
the Federal attack on Southern discrimination are considered, there is significant alignment the 
strength of the Federal pressure in the South and the accompanying rise in black economic 
status there.”); James J. Heckman & Brook S. Payner, Determining the Impact of Federal 
Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina, 79 AM. 
ECON. REV. 138, 173 (1989) (“Government activity . . . seems to be the most plausible source 
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however, have not shown a proclivity toward bringing ADA class 
action suits.103 The same is true for public interest law firms that have 
shown themselves willing to use the class action device in disability 
discrimination cases outside the employment context.104 Instead, 
because courts and commentators hesitate to view individuals with 
diverse disabilities as having a sufficient community of interest to 
proceed under a group-based discrimination theory, Title I litigation 
has focused on the definition of disability or the reasonableness of 
individual accommodations.105 
B. Missed Potential 
The use of group-based discrimination theories of disparate 
impact law and the class action device could have facilitated the entry 
of people with disabilities into the workplace, much as they 
previously did on behalf of persons of color and women. Modeled 
after Title VII, the ADA shares in its desire to eradicate historical and 
avoidable barriers to workplace participation—the “built in 
headwinds” that form the provenance of disparate impact theory.106 
As articulated by Judge Richard Posner in a nondisability disparate 
 
for this change [in black economomic progress].”); see Richard Butler & James J. Heckman, The 
Government’s Impact on the Labor Market Status of Black Americans: A Critical Review, in 
EQUAL RIGHTS AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 235, 252 (Leonard J. Hausman et al. eds., 1977). 
 103. This is not to belittle either individual employment suits, or actions brought under 
other provisions of the statute. They are important. However, the commitment to using civil 
rights statutes to leverage broad social change has been glaringly absent in the context of 
disability discrimination. For instance, although the EEOC’s workload increased dramatically 
due to the addition of ADA disputes, its budget remained largely unchanged. See Kathryn Moss 
et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implementation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 73 
(2001) (“With the enactment of the ADA, the EEOC experienced a 53% increase in yearly 
charge receipts [from 1990 to 1994] . . . . During this time of a tremendous increase . . . , the 
EEOC yearly budget rose less than 10% in real dollar terms . . . . While the 15% budget 
increase approved by Congress for the 1999 fiscal year has helped increase staffing and 
resources, this increase is still not commensurate with the increase in workload the EEOC has 
experienced in the past decade.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 104. See, e.g., Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 265 (2d Cir. 2003) (class action 
challenging accommodations in New York City Social Services); Barden v. City of Sacramento, 
292 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (class action challenging inaccessible sidewalks); Nelson v. 
Miller, 170 F.3d 641, 644 (6th Cir. 1999) (class action challenging Michigan voting systems). 
 105. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 22, at 71 & n.37 (suggesting that the “most notable 
example” of a lack of disparate impact class action litigation is the ADA). 
 106. See, e.g., DiBiase v. SmithKline Beechum Co., 48 F.3d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1995) (“‘The 
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past . . . .’” (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971))). 
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impact employment discrimination case: “The concept of disparate 
impact was developed for the purpose of identifying situations in 
which, through inertia or insensitivity, companies were following 
policies that gratuitously . . . excluded black or female workers from 
equal employment opportunities.”107 Yet, neither judges nor scholars 
have felt comfortable replacing “black or female workers” with 
“disabled workers.”108 In consequence, the ADA’s first fifteen years 
may be justly criticized as having missed opportunities to challenge 
barriers excluding workers with disabilities.109 The shift by courts 
away from an earlier paradigm of race- and sex-based collective 
action has exacerbated this failing. This wholesale exclusion of group-
based discrimination theories from Title I is myopic, and certainly not 
inevitable.110 Despite the interpretive regulations’ discussion of 
individualized assessments,111 the ADA itself does not foreclose 
collective action. 
 
 107. Finnegan v. Transworld Airways, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 108. Cf. Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 643, 
643–44 (2001) (“[O]bservers sharply contrast Title VII . . . and other older civil rights 
enactments, which are said to be ‘real anti-discrimination law[s],’ with the [ADA] . . . said to be 
‘accommodation’ laws. On these observers’ view, ‘antidiscrimination’ focuses on ‘equal’ 
treatment, while ‘accommodation’ focuses on ‘special’ treatment.” (second alteration in 
original) (footnotes omitted)). 
 109. Several studies have documented the inability of the ADA to move people with 
disabilities in greater numbers into the workforce. The federal government’s National Health 
Information Survey found that when disability is defined as an impairment that imposes 
limitations on any life activity, the employment rate for working-age people with disabilities 
declined from 49 percent in 1990 to 46.6 percent in 1996. See H. STEPHEN KAYE, IMPROVED 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 9 & fig.1 (2003). Similarly, a 
2000 Harris Survey of working-age people with disabilities showed that only 32 percent of 
people with disabilities reported being employed, compared with 81 percent of the general 
population. NAT’L ORG. ON DISABILITY, 2000 N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES 27 (2000). This is not to say that we characterize the overall ADA experience 
negatively. The jury is still out on how efficacious the statute has been and, perhaps more 
importantly, on how to measure success. At the same time, much ink has been, and will continue 
to be spilled on this issue. A balanced, but far from unanimous critique, are the essays in THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael Ashley Stein & 
Samuel Estreicher eds., forthcoming 2007). 
 110. For an intra-Title comparison of ADA litigation, see generally Michael E. Waterstone, 
The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807 
(2005). 
 111. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. (2006) (“[T]he determination of whether an individual is 
qualified for a particular position must necessarily be made on a case-by-case basis. . . . [A]n 
accommodation must be tailored to match the needs of the disabled individual with the needs of 
the job’s essential functions. This case-by-case approach is essential . . . . [N]either the ADA nor 
this part can supply the ‘correct’ answer in advance for each employment decision . . . .”); see 
also id. § 1630.2(j) (“The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not 
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As an initial matter, the dearth of failure to accommodate claims 
treated under the Title VII disparate impact framework is puzzling. In 
addition to prohibiting denials of reasonable accommodation requests, 
the ADA also proscribes other actions corresponding to those barred 
by Title VII.112 Specifically, it forbids the use of administrative 
methods, criteria, and standards that tend to exclude disabled 
workers in the manner proscribed by disparate impact theories.113 This 
confluence is the result of Congress’s conscious decision to model the 
ADA after Title VII.114 Correspondingly, Title I is as silent on the 
motivation behind a refusal to provide accommodation as the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 is on the level of necessary intent.115 That failure to 
accommodate claims were intended to fall somewhere within the 
panoply of previous civil rights remedies can also be inferred from the 
 
necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the 
effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.”). 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2000); see also id. § 12112(b)(1)–(7) (listing seven 
varieties of prohibited employment-related activities). 
 113. Id. § 12112(b)(3), (6), (7) (banning practices with disproportionate effect). The ADA 
also makes illegal the conscious exclusion and segregation of disabled workers typical of 
disparate treatment analysis. Id. § 12112(b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4) (prohibiting overt treatment 
policies). 
 114. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and 
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 464 
(1991) (averring that the “ADA committee reports expressly declare congressional intent that 
the ‘futile gesture’ doctrine recognized by the courts in actions under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 should also apply to actions under this Act.” (footnote omitted)); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 82 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 305 (“An 
agreement was made that people with disabilities should have the same remedies available to all 
other minorities under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”); S. REP. NO. 100-116, at 42–43 
(1989) (“[T]he [ADA] legislation specifies that the remedies and procedures set forth in 
Sections 706, 707, 709, and 710 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 shall be available with respect 
to . . . any individual who believes that he or she is being subjected to discrimination on the basis 
of disability . . . .”); Richard K. Scotch, Making Change: The ADA as an Instrument of Social 
Reform, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR 
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 275, 276 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) 
(“Using the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a legislative template, the ADA seeks to eliminate the 
marginalization of people with disabilities through established civil rights remedies to 
discrimination.”). 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2000). So, too, are the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission’s promulgated interpretive guidelines. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(b) (2006) (stating that 
discrimination occurs when a covered entity “den[ies] employment opportunities to an 
otherwise qualified job applicant or employee with a disability based on the need of such 
covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to such individual’s physical or mental 
impairments”). 
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inclusion of all ADA remedies among those antidiscrimination 
provisions amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.116 
Although federal courts have not articulated a reason for not 
applying disparate impact analysis to ADA failure to accommodate 
claims, three plausible juridical reasons can be inferred.117 First, although 
the handful of judges who have addressed the possibility of applying 
disparate impact theory to failure to accommodate cases do so 
tangentially, their oblique references suggest that federal courts view 
allegations of failure to accommodate as a mutually exclusive and stand-
alone alternative to disparate impact claims. For example, while 
addressing a potential claim, the Seventh Circuit in Hoffman v. 
Caterpillar, Inc.118 held that once a disabled plaintiff establishes her 
qualifications to proceed under the ADA, “she may show 
discrimination in either of two ways: by presenting evidence of disparate 
treatment or by showing a failure to accommodate.”119 The notion that a 
plaintiff might proceed with a disparate impact theory was not 
considered by the court as being within the realm of possibility. Similar 
statements have been made, in dicta, by other courts, thereby lending 
credence to this supposition.120 However, neither the ADA’s text nor its 
legislative history support this mutually exclusive perception.121 
 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2000) (incorporating the provisions of both Title VII and the 
ADA). 
 117. Another plausible (although less appealing) political reason might be judicial hostility 
to the ADA. To quote one disability rights advocate: “[M]any, perhaps most, courts are not 
enforcing the law, but instead are finding incredibly inventive means of interpreting the ADA to 
achieve the opposite result that the Act was intended to achieve.” Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The 
ADA’s Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 338 
(2001). Tucker’s assertion has been endorsed by a number of scholars. See, e.g., Chai R. 
Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? 
Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 93 (2000) (“How 
did those of us who helped draft the ADA so completely misread how the courts would apply its 
definition of disability?”). See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, Backlash Against the ADA: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000). 
 118. Hoffman v. Caterpillar, Inc., 256 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 119. Id. at 572; cf. Butlemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“[T]his is not a disparate treatment claim, but a reasonable accommodation claim, and it must 
be analyzed differently.”). 
 120. See, e.g., Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 275 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Other courts 
have explicitly distinguished claims based on failure reasonably to accommodate from those 
based on disparate impact.”); Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1166 (1st Cir. 
2002) (“In addition to forbidding disparate treatment of those with disabilities, the ADA makes 
it unlawful for an employer to fail to provide reasonable accommodations . . . .”); Wright v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Corr., 204 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2000) (“There are two types of disability 
discrimination claims under the ADA: disparate treatment claims and failure to accommodate 
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A second, related reason that courts may hesitate to apply 
disparate impact theory to ADA claims is if they believe Title I to have 
a relatively less clear statutory basis for disparate impact than Title 
VII.122 The 1991 amendments to Title VII, enacted in the aftermath of 
Wards Cove, unequivocally state that the disparate impact proof 
structure may be applied to all actions brought under its aegis.123 In 
contrast, the ADA does not contain as firm a statutory foundation for 
upholding disparate impact law. But this, too, is unpersuasive. As noted 
in the previous Section, the Supreme Court held in Raytheon that 
disparate impact claims may be brought under the ADA.124 Although 
the Court in Raytheon had no occasion to consider whether failure to 
accommodate claims could also be brought under disparate impact 
theory, there is no statutory reason they should not be. Indeed, in 
Raytheon, the Court held that “standards, criteria, or methods of 
administration,” and “qualification standards, employment tests, or 
other selection criteria” were cognizable under disparate impact theory, 
 
claims.”); García-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 646 n.9 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
ADA does more than prohibit disparate treatment. It also imposes an affirmative obligation to 
provide reasonable accommodation to disabled employees.”); Dunlap v. Ass’n of Bay Area 
Gov’ts, 996 F. Supp. 962, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (“A disability discrimination claim may be 
brought either on the theory that defendant failed to make reasonable accommodations or on a 
more conventional disparate treatment theory . . . .”). 
 121. If anything, the legislative history supports the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., S. REP. 
NO. 101-116, 30 (1989) (“Subparagraphs (B) and (C) [of § 102(b)(3) of the ADA] incorporate a 
disparate impact standard to ensure that the legislative mandate to end discrimination does not 
ring hollow. This standard is consistent with the interpretation of section 504 [of the 
Rehabilitation Act] by the U.S. Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).”); 
see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 933 Before the Comm. on Labor 
and Human Resources and the Subcomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong. 321 (1989) 
(statement of Arlene Mayerson, Directing Attorney, Disability Rights Education and Defense 
Fund) (“It is well accepted under Title VII that selection procedures that have a disparate 
impact on racial minorities and women must be necessary to safe and efficient job performance. 
The ADA extends that protection to persons with disabilities who, as demonstrated earlier, are 
often subject to disqualifying physical or mental criteria that bear no relationship to job 
performance.”). 
 122. This may not be surprising as the clarity and persuasiveness of legislative history itself 
differentiates two recent Supreme Court ADA opinions. Compare Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of 
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001) (majority of the Court unconvinced of the sufficiency of 
legislative history of States discriminating in employment), with Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 
509, 529–30 (2004) (Court majority won over by legislative evidence of States discriminating in 
the provision of services). 
 123. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000) (providing that “[a]n unlawful employment 
practice based on disparate impact is established under this title only if—,” and then continuing 
by describing disparate impact proof structure). 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 93. 
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because they were part of Title I’s definition of disability.125 “Not 
providing reasonable accommodations” is likewise part of the same 
statutory definition of disability.126 
A third reason why courts may not have embraced failure to 
accommodate as disparate impact cases relates to perceived 
similarities between the ADA and the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act127 (ADEA).128 In 2005, in Smith v. City of Jackson,129 
the Supreme Court clarified that disparate impact claims can be 
brought under the ADEA.130 Before Smith, however, courts that had 
not readily recognized disparate impact theory in ADEA cases131 may 
have viewed the ADA in the same vein.132 However, in addition to 
Supreme Court clarification on both accounts, the argument for 
applying disparate impact to ADA failure to accommodate claims is 
even stronger than in the ADEA context. Both the ADA and Title 
VII were promulgated as a means of eradicating historical barriers to 
 
 125. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 51 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)). 
 126. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000). 
 127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). 
 128. Stevens v. Kay Mgmt., 907 F. Supp. 169, 171–72 (E.D. Va. 1995) (“When called upon to 
interpret the ADA, other courts often have looked to the [ADEA] . . . for guidance. The ADA 
[and] ADEA . . . have virtually identical definitions and liability schemes and all are designed 
with a common purpose: to prohibit discrimination in employment.”). The most extensive 
treatment of this (now incorrect) analogy in the legal literature is by Samuel Issacharoff. See 
Samuel Issacharoff, The Difficult Path from Observation to Prescription, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 
37 (2002) (concluding that the creation of causes of action for disability and age discrimination 
required “significant contortions” of antidiscrimination law); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Erica 
Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 781 (1997) (positing that “the ADEA statutory scheme misconstrues the 
antidiscrimination model”); Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a 
Difference: Can Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities 
Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 314 (2001) (citing the ADA’s reasonable accommodation standard as 
unique in that it, unlike Title VII, begins its inquiry with “the claim that different sets of 
employees who are differently situated”). 
 129. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 130. Id. at 233–40. 
 131. The basis of this position is Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), wherein 
the Supreme Court suggested, but did not expressly hold, that disparate impact theory does not 
apply to the ADEA, see id. at 610 (“Disparate treatment . . . captures the essence of what 
Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA.”). 
 132. According to that argument, age, like disability, reduces individuals’ productivity. 
Consequently, both forms of regulation engender additional costs that employers must bear. 
When businesses are required to forego discriminatory practices under the ADA, they overlook 
the same type of lower net-product margin that they do for workers under the ADEA, and 
thereby redistribute wealth from otherwise profit-maximizing employers to those less 
economically efficient but protected employees. See supra note 128. 
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workplace participation, the traditional province of disparate impact 
theory.133 The ADEA, in contrast, placed greater emphasis on 
disparate treatment type of discrimination.134 Most crucially, the 
ADEA applies to individuals nearer to the end of their livelihoods 
than those individuals vulnerable to discrimination over the course of 
their careers.135 As a consequence of this different timing, groups of 
workers covered by Title VII and the ADA are more likely to be 
adversely affected to the extent that they will not develop their own 
human capital.136 In the case of people with disabilities, for whom 
special welfare legislation has in the past been enacted on the 
 
 133. See, e.g., DiBiase v. SmithKline Beechum Co., 48 F.3d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1995) (“‘The 
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past . . . .’” (quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971))); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)–(5) (2000) (setting forth the 
legislative findings regarding the historical exclusion of people with disabilities from American 
society, including the workplace). 
 134. See, e.g., Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1008 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that 
“the legislative history of the ADEA suggests it was not enacted to address disparate impact 
claims”); Hiatt v. Union Pacific R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1436 (D. Wyo. 1994) (“In Griggs, the 
critical fact was the link between the history of educational discrimination and the use of that 
discrimination as a means of presently disadvantaging African-Americans. These concerns 
simply are not present when the alleged disparate impact is based on age.”); Douglas C. Herbert 
& Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against Applying the Disparate Impact 
Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 647 (1996) (noting that the 
congressional concern “‘with eliminating arbitrary barriers to employment’” in the Title VII 
context cannot be extended “‘to an history of past discrimination against these particular 
individuals who were previously younger and possibly the beneficiaries of . . . age 
discrimination’” (quoting Hiatt, 859 F. Supp. at 1436)). 
 135. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2002) (applying to workers at or over the age of forty). 
 136. This is because individuals who are dissuaded by bleak prospects of fully participating 
in the labor market lower their own expectations, internalize poorer self-worth, and invest less 
in their own development, for example, in educational or vocational training. This brings about 
a self-fulfilling prophecy that shunts those individuals toward lower paying, under-demanding 
positions. See generally Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 
70 J. POL. ECON. (SUPPLEMENT) 9, 9 (1962) (“The many ways to invest [in human capital] 
includ[ing] schooling . . . [and] training . . . . improve the physical and mental abilities of people 
and thereby raise real income prospects.”); Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative 
Protections for People with Disabilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United 
States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 215–16 (1997) (“America’s version of capitalism . . . . 
[wrongly] assumes that utility and efficiency for the entrepreneurial class must be the dominant 
principles. [Other Western countries, however] favor the welfare of the worker out of the 
conviction that such policies benefit both workers and the economy as a whole.”). This situation 
also reinforces the notion of people with anomalous biological traits being construed as 
inauthentic workers. See Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1898 (2000) 
(“[C]ourts all too often accept as an excuse for job segregation that women ‘lack interest’ in the 
higher-paying, more desirable positions held by men. . . . [W]omen’s work preferences . . . are 
seen as fixed by forces that are ontologically and temporally prior to [their] experiences in the 
world of paid work.”). 
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presupposition that they cannot work,137 the worst-case effect of 
discouragement from seeking integration in the workplace is that they 
feel compelled to accept public assistance for sustenance, and are 
thereby excluded from labor market participation.138 
Yet even if any of these explanations accurately describes the way 
in which courts have been reluctant to engage in traditional 
employment discrimination analyses when disability-related 
accommodations are at issue, it nonetheless still begs the question of 
why courts would adopt this approach.139 Both employment 
discrimination and disability law literature are nearly silent on the 
potential for group-based discrimination theories for people with 
disabilities. There is some limited discussion about the similarities 
between disparate impact law and reasonable accommodation,140 but 
most commentators are otherwise fairly dismissive of the potential of 
group-based discrimination theories (expressed through disparate 
 
 137. MICHAEL J. PIORE, BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM: HOW SOCIAL DEMANDS OF THE NEW 
IDENTITY GROUPS CHALLENGE AMERICAN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE 36–44 (1995) 
(“The goal of employment policy is preeminently individualistic: it is the distribution of jobs and 
work rewards on the basis of the personal merit of the employee. . . . The law was designed to 
sanction exceptional departures from meritocracy.”). 
 138. See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF 
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 97 (1983) (“The assumption that handicapped people are fundamentally 
different and inherently restricted in their ability to participate becomes self-fulfilling as 
handicapped people are excluded from education, employment, and other aspects of society by 
these consequences of the handicapped-normal dichotomy.”). 
 139. Parenthetically, the exclusion of failure to accommodate suits from either prong of the 
traditional framework might also be a result of courts viewing those claims as equivalent to non-
accommodation suits in the religious discrimination context. See generally Laura S. Underkuffler, 
“Discrimination” on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of Attempted Value Neutrality in 
Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 581 (1989) (exploring the line between religious belief 
and Title VII religious discrimination in the workplace). Although religion-based protection 
requires the provision of de minimis (rather than reasonable) accommodations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) 
(2000), courts have also routinely treated religious non-accommodation claims as falling outside the 
scope of standard discrimination analysis. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 
U.S. 63, 83 (1977) (finding that an employee’s request to observe Sabbath involved an undue 
hardship for the defendant-employer as it required violating a collective bargaining agreement 
involving seniority). Whether this reasoning actually motivates courts to reject failure to 
accommodate claims must remain a matter of conjecture. If judges believe that this parallel exists 
between disability and religious accommodation claims, they have yet to articulate this position. 
 140. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the 
Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 911 (2004) (“The fundamental likeness 
between reasonable accommodation and disparate impact lies in their common goal of 
eliminating unjustified barriers to equal workplace opportunity and inclusion.”); see also Jolls, 
supra note 108, at 645 (“[S]ome aspects of antidiscrimination law—in particular its disparate 
impact branch—are in fact requirements of accommodation.”). 
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impact and/or class action law) in disability employment 
discrimination cases. 
Although not clearly articulated, the argument against group-
based theories seems to be predicated on the notion that race and sex 
have, as groups, two unifying features that the disabled are missing. 
First, race and sex are biologically and socially distinct categories, 
whereas the disability classification is comprised of people with many 
individual variations.141 Second, racial minorities and women can 
request classwide relief from discriminatory policies in a “one-size-
fits-all” manner, but that people with disabilities need specific 
accommodations that vary from individual to individual.142 
The next Part challenges these assumptions. Viewed through the 
lens of pandisability, we argue that disability is much like race (and to 
a lesser degree, sex) in being a social construct when used as an 
exclusionary proxy. The group-based external perception of the 
disabled, like earlier notions of race and sex, should create a common 
umbrella for purposes of disparate impact law and class certification. 
Thus, even if disabled workers request accommodations that are 
“individualized”—a concept that itself is overblown when one 
considers the notion of Universal Design143—it is their commonly 
experienced stigma that should bind the class together for purposes of 
group-based litigation theories. 
III.  THE ADA AS GROUP-BASED DISCRIMINATION 
Part II demonstrated that group-based discrimination theories 
have neither been actively pursued nor accepted under Title I. 
Section A argues for the use of pandisability theory as a heuristic for 
determining group-based disability employment claims. Next, Section 
 
 141. See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially 
Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2319 (2006) (“[F]ew class actions are 
brought under the employment provisions of the ADA because of the predominance of 
individual issues, such as the nature and extent of a plaintiff’s disability . . . .”). 
 142. Issacharoff and Nelson come the closest to articulating this point: 
[H]ow should courts answer the question whether United Airlines should have to 
place another co-pilot in each cockpit for every pilot whose vision is worse than 
20/100? . . . If a pilot is hypertensive, should United be forced to place a doctor in the 
cockpit in order to give life-sustaining CPR in the case of a heart attack? 
Issacharoff & Nelson, supra note 128, at 340–41. 
 143. Universal Design is an architectural concept whose goal is to design products that are 
usable by all people, to the greatest extent possible, without the need for adaptation or special 
design. Ctr. for Universal Design, N.C. State Univ., Principles of Universal Design, http://www. 
design.ncsu.edu/cud/about_ud/about_ud.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2006). 
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B demonstrates the neat convergence of the pandisability model with 
the class action procedure. Finally, Section C shows how group-based 
disability employment actions, as conceived by pandisability theory 
and framed by the class action device, can start to challenge deeply 
entrenched norms that bar disability workplace participation. 
A. Pandisability Theory 
Panethnicity has been used as a proxy to treat internally 
heterogeneous individuals as having a set and unifying identity for the 
purpose of externally addressing that group’s social standing.144 What 
makes this norm particularly salient in race discrimination is modern-
day recognition that race is an artificial construct.145 Having evolved 
from an historical understanding as an inherent biological fact 
(correlated at one time by the number of African “drops of blood” a 
person possessed),146 race is understood as a contextual147 and 
politically contingent category.148 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 created 
a similar standard for the less-malleable category of sex149 by 
 
 144. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 145. A good illustration of this fact is the treatment of race as being capable of encompassing 
more than one category (“multi-racial”) in the most recent census. This represents a significant 
break with past practice, as it is the first time that individuals may claim multiple racial identities. 
U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classifications Used in Census 2000 and Beyond, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html (last visited Oct. 17, 
2006). Scientific evidence also clearly indicates that, from a genetic perspective, race is either a non-
existent or an insignificant factor. Noah A. Rosenberg et al., Genetic Structure of Human 
Populations, 298 SCI. MAG. 2381, 2381 (2002). 
 146. F. JAMES DAVIS, ONE NATION’S DEFINITION 1–15 (1991); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, 
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 124–29 (1996); see, e.g., Marre v. Marre, 
168 S.W. 636, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1914); Younger v. Juda, 111 Mo. 303, 308 (Mo. 1892); People v. 
Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 430 (Mich. 1866). 
 147. Ariela Gross’s scholarship on the historical use of law in determining race adds further 
evidence to the notion of race as a social construct. Professor Gross wisely demonstrates how, 
because the fractions of blood were not determinative, trials in nineteenth century Southern county 
courts investigated the “racial ‘essence’ inhering in one’s blood” by asking juries to decide whether 
particular individuals “performed” white or black. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials 
of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 111 (1998). 
 148. For recent assertions by two commentators on how race is currently perceived through 
the lens of behavior rather than biology and so discrimination must be engaged on that level, 
see Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the 
Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1269 (2005) and Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait 
Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 365, 366 (2006). 
 149. 42 U.S.C. 2000e–2(a)(1) (2000). Exceptions from this rule are those few individuals 
who change their sex. See, e.g., Julie A. Greenberg, An Interdisciplinary and Cross-Cultural 
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examining socially created gender roles;150 as a consequence, the 
Supreme Court has come to evaluate claims of physical difference 
and equality in light of social convention.151 
Traditional employment law scholarship draws a bright line 
between race and sex discrimination, on the one hand, and disability 
discrimination, on the other. Indeed, the view that disability 
discrimination is inherently different is so prevalent that one scholar 
has termed it “canonical.”152 According to this received wisdom, 
discrimination on the basis of race or sex is unjust because these 
characteristics do not correlate with job performance; conversely, 
disability is relevant because it is a biological reality that corresponds 
to lower productivity. In consequence, providing workplace 
accommodations to the disabled does more than level an uneven 
playing field, it elevates them to a position that is more than equal.153 
As argued previously by one of the coauthors, this is a false 
dichotomy.154 It is chiefly predicated on notions regarding disability 
that parallel now-discredited social conventions that women were  
 
 
Analysis of Binary Sex Categories, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS: HISTORY, POLITICS, AND LAW 
212 (Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter eds., 2003). 
 150. See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An 
Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167 (2004) (arguing that Title VII protects against 
personal trait discrimination that stems from gender norms and stereotypes that are incongruent 
with workplace equality). 
 151. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982) (observing that sex-
based differential treatment was merely a codification of empirically unsubstantiated social 
convention); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (“And what differentiates sex 
from such nonsuspect statuses . . . and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the 
sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.”). 
 152. Jolls, supra note 108, at 643 (“[L]egal requirements that actors take affirmative steps to 
‘accommodate’ the special, distinctive needs of particular groups, such as individuals with 
disabilities . . . strike many observers as fundamentally distinct from, broader than, and often 
less legitimate than legal requirements within the canonical ‘antidiscrimination’ category.”). 
 153. See, e.g., Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in 
DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 21 (Carolyn L. Weaver 
ed., 1991) (“Fundamentally the ADA is not an antidiscrimination law. By forcing employers to 
pay for work site and other job accommodations that might allow workers with impairing 
conditions defined by the law to compete on equal terms, it would require firms to treat unequal 
people equally, thus discriminating in favor of the disabled.”). 
 154. Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as 
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 581–84 (2004). 
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physically less capable than men,155 and that race was a biological 
absolute.156 
If these lessons of race and sex as group-based categories have 
been learned (at least as far as formal legal recognition), society still 
grapples with the concept of artificial constructs respecting disability. 
Courts and commentators continue to treat the essential nature of 
disability as an objectively determinable medical fact157 that manifests 
in lower abilities than nondisabled persons.158 From a group-based 
litigation perspective, disability is also viewed as being too 
individualized for claims and interests to be aggregated. In other 
words, the disability designation is seen to capture too wide a range of 
 
 155. In particular, it was asserted that women’s reproductive functions evidenced their 
frailty. BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF 
THE EXPERTS’ ADVICE TO WOMEN 134 (1979) (“Doctors had established that women are sick, 
that this sickness is innate, and stems from the very possession of a uterus and ovaries.”). 
 156. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 30–72 (1981) (describing the use of 
scientific thought to mold thinking about the intellectual inferiority of blacks); Kenneth L. Karst, 
Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. 
REV. 263, 270 (1995) (noting that in the past “science reinforced white supremacy”). 
 157. Although the ADA is often cast in terms of being a creation of the “civil rights” model 
of disability, see PETER BLANCK ET AL., DISABILITY CIVIL RIGHTS LAW & POLICY: CASES & 
MATERIALS 4-4 to -6 (2005), the primary focus of ADA litigation, especially in the employment 
context, has focused on who is covered under the Act, see, e.g., RUTHERGLEN, supra note 22, at 
221–23 (surveying principal cases of the last twenty years dealing with the issue of who is 
covered under the Act). These cases have focused on whether an individual has a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits that individual in one or more major life activities. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (requiring that impairment limit a major life activity). The 
disproportionate emphasis on whether individuals meet this definition actually brings the ADA 
closer to an earlier (non-civil rights) model of disability, where medical professionals opined 
whether individuals were truly “disabled.” See, e.g., BLANCK ET AL., supra, at 3-4 to -23. 
Furthermore, even though the definition of a disability was intended to include society’s 
response to disability, it has generally not been interpreted by courts in this way. See 42 U.S.C.  
§ 12102(2)(C) (2000); Arlene Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong: Giving 
Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 587 (1997) (discussing courts’ restrictive 
interpretations of the “regarded as” definition of the term “disability”). 
 158. See Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the 
Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in 
Constitutional Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 92 (2002) (“Historically, courts have 
addressed the constitutionality of limiting opportunity for classes delineated in terms of 
biological differences by considering two related questions. First, does the class members’ 
biological difference relate to . . . ‘reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday 
world,’ . . . ? Second, does the class members’ reduced ability to cope and function usually place 
the public in need of special protection?” (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985))); see also Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employable 
Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL’Y STUD. J. 551, 551–53 (1987) (highlighting the medical 
orientation and economic understanding used to analyze disabilities). 
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human variation to be treated as a coherent community.159 Much 
heavy weather is made of the heterogeneity of disability with the 
result that, rather than being viewed as systemically excluded by the 
environment, disability is held to be the by-product of individual 
workers not fitting into particular workplace circumstances.160 
Consequently, assertions of disability discrimination have been 
closeted into a narrow category that examines the reasonableness of a 
particular accommodation to a single individual rather than 
questioning the larger issue of whether a hostile workplace 
environment was constructed that excluded employees with 
disabilities. 
Contrary to this endogenous view, Disability Studies scholars 
(much like their Critical Race predecessors) challenge the disability 
classification as contingent on biological fact. They argue for a 
“social” model of disability in which the physical environment and the 
attitudes it reflects play a controlling (if not central) role in creating 
what society terms “disability.” Factors external to a person’s own 
 
 159. Disability Studies scholars take issue with this position, averring that disabled people 
share a common culture. See, e.g., SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND 
IDENTITY 4 (1998) (“We[,] [people with disabilities,] are all bound together, not by [a] list of . . . 
collective symptoms but by the social and political circumstances that have forged us as a 
group.”); Sharon N. Barnartt, Disability Culture or Disability Consciousness?, 7 J. DISABILITY 
POL’Y STUD. 1, 2 (1996) (“I suggest that the concept of collective consciousness better describes 
what is occurring within the disability community . . . [which] has implications for 
policymaking.”); Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky, Introduction: Disability History: From 
the Margins to the Mainstream, in NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 1, 4 
(Paul K. Longmore & Lauri Umansky eds., 2001) (“There has always been a variety of disability 
experiences. At the same time, . . . experiences of cultural devaluation and socially imposed 
restriction of personal and collective struggles for self-definition and self-determination[] recur 
across the various disability groups throughout their particular histories.”); Susan Peters, Is 
There a Disability Culture? A Syncretisation of Three Possible World Views, 15 DISABILITY & 
SOC’Y 583, 598 (2000) (“The roots of disability cultural identity are the elements of culture 
contained in the historical/linguistic world-view where we have collectively produced our own 
cultural meanings, subjectivities and images; e.g. a common language/lexicon that connotes 
pride and self-love, cohesive social communities.”); Susan Reynolds Whyte, Disability between 
Discourse and Experience, in DISABILITY AND CULTURE 267, 279 (Susan Reynolds Whyte ed., 
1995) (“In practice . . . the experience of disability is still embedded in cultural assumptions and 
social relations, the ‘local moral worlds,’ of which even the most committed empathetic 
humanism must take account.”); cf. Richard K. Scotch & Kay Schriner, Disability as Human 
Variation: Implications for Policy, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148, 154–57 (1997) 
(asserting that humanity, by definition, is varied with disability merely comprising one 
manifestation from an idealized norm). 
 160. Ruth O’Brien terms this phenomenon the “whole man” schema and avers that it is 
influenced by vocational rehabilitation policies. RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE 
HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 63–87 (2000). 
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impairments are therefore determinative of an individual’s ability to 
function in society.161 This is in sharp contrast to the “medical” model 
of disability that views a disabled person’s limitations as naturally 
(and thus properly, even if unfortunately) excluding her from the 
mainstream.162 Several branches of Disability Studies scholarship 
grapple with the historical origin of the disability classification,163 and 
thus with the source of able-bodied society’s negative feelings toward 
people with disabilities.164 A few of these commentators identify the 
source of aversive treatment as animus.165 And, to be fair, statutory,166 
 
 161. See, e.g., SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 35 (1996) (“[T]he biological reality of a disability and the social 
construction of a disability . . . . are interactive not only in that complex interactions of social 
factors and our bodies affect health and functioning, but also in that social arrangements can 
make a biological condition more or less relevant to almost any situation.”); Ron Amundson, 
Disability, Handicap, and the Environment, 23 J. SOC. PHIL. 105, 110 (1992) (“[A] handicap 
results from the interaction between a disability and an environment.”); Scotch, supra note 114, 
at 275 (“[A] social model of disability that conceptualizes disability as a social construction that 
is the result of interaction between physical or mental impairment and the social 
environment.”). 
 162. See CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 11 (1988) (“The 
medical/pathological paradigm of ‘disability legislation’ effected a shift from physical inferiority to 
social inferiority by forcing an emphasis on the handicapped individual, and by discouraging 
acknowledgement of socially created sources of deviance.”); Kenny Fries, Introduction to 
STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM THE INSIDE OUT 1, 6–7 (Kenny Fries ed., 
1997) (“[T]his view of disability . . . puts the blame squarely on the individual.”). 
 163. See generally Douglas Baynton, Disability and the Justification of Inequality in American 
History, in NEW DISABILITY HISTORY: AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, supra note 159, at 33, 33–57; 
Hanoch Livneh, On the Origins of Negative Attitudes Towards People with Disabilities, 43 
REHABILITATION LITERATURE 338 (1982). 
 164. For a sociological approach, see MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A 
SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH (1990), R. William English, Correlates of Stigma Toward Physically 
Disabled Persons, 2 REHABILITATION RES. & PRAC. REV. 1 (1971), Norman Goodman et al., 
Variant Reactions to Physical Disabilities, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 429 (1963), Stephen A. Richardson et 
al., Cultural Uniformity in Reaction to Physical Disabilities, 26 AM. SOC. REV. 241 (1961). 
 165. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED 
IDENTITY 5 (1963) (asserting that stigma manifests when “we believe the person with a stigma is 
not quite human”); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the 
Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy For People With Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. 
REV. 1341, 1343–1345 (1993) (identifying intolerance and discrimination as part and parcel of 
the reasons excluding people with disabilities’ equal social participation); see also City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461–62 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Fueled by the rising tide of Social Darwinism, the ‘science’ of 
eugenics, and the extreme xenophobia of those years . . . . [a] regime of state-mandated 
segregation and degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled . . . the worst 
excesses of Jim Crow.”). 
 166. For example, over the period 1900 to 1928 more than twenty-five states enacted 
mandatory sterilization laws for the disabled, often directed at impairments known not to be 
hereditary such as blindness and epilepsy. See Laurence A. Stith, Sterilization of the Unfit, 32 
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anecdotal,167 and case law168 evidence does lend selected support to that 
claim.169 Nonetheless, the vast majority of these commentators believe 
that differential treatment is grounded in pity and paternalism.170 At the 
same time, nearly all also accord some influence (whether resulting in 
overt or unconscious differential treatment) to the phenomenon of 
“existential anxiety,” which inspires an able-bodied person to think 
“there but for the grace of God go I” when encountering a person with 
a disability.171 Existential anxiety can lead to both awkward interaction 
 
LAW NOTES 108 (1928); Amos Reynolds, The Prevention of Pauperism, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES HELD AT CHICAGO 210–16 (1879), quoted in 
DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES 187 (1968) (“[T]he state should 
prohibit the marriage of all persons who . . . are suffering from any incurable bodily infirmity or 
deformity.”). A recent and comprehensive treatment is EDWIN BLACK, WAR AGAINST THE 
WEAK: EUGENICS AND AMERICA’S CAMPAIGN TO CREATE A MASTER RACE (2003). 
 167. Compiled in S. REP. NO. 101-116 (1989), the more compelling anecdotal evidence 
included testimony by a wheelchair-using future undersecretary of the Department of 
Education who was removed from an auction house for being deemed “disgusting to look at,” 
and about an academically competitive and nondisruptive child who was barred from attending 
public school because of a teacher’s allegation that his physical appearance “produced a 
nauseating effect” upon classmates. Id. at 6–7. 
 168. See, e.g., Otting v. J.C. Penney Co., 223 F.3d 704, 712 (8th Cir. 2000) (ruling that a jury 
could have reasonably found that the employer had acted maliciously). 
 169. A different and interesting approach is provided in Michelle A. Travis, Perceived 
Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes,” 55 VAND. L. REV. 481 (2002). Applying 
cognitive psychology literature, Professor Travis describes from a psychological perspective how 
and why members of society, including employers and judges, would consider a nondisabled 
person as being disabled. Id. at 509–42. 
 170. See, e.g., ALAN GARTNER & TOM JOE, IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 
(1987) (demonstrating how the disabled are characterized as feeble or incapable, and are often 
objectified); PAUL LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON DISABILITY 
1131–48 (2003) (describing images of pity that Hollywood and other mass media disseminate 
about people with disabilities); Feldblum, supra note 117, at 165 (asserting that the general 
public’s view is that “disabled people lack value and are to be pitied”). These assertions are 
substantiated by at least one public opinion poll. See LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., THE 
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE DISABLED SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS: BRINGING 
DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 13 (1986) (74 percent of Americans felt pity 
toward disabled individuals). 
 171. The term originates with Harlan Hahn, a political scientist from University of Southern 
California and one of the founders of the Disability Studies movement, who asserted that 
repugnance to disabled bodily difference, combined with fear of also attaining such variation in 
the future, results in a sociological desire to segregate people with disabilities from the 
mainstream. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and 
Discrimination, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 39, 43–44 (1988) (“Probably the most common threat from 
disabled individuals is summed up in the concept of existential anxiety: the perceived threat that 
a disability could interfere with functional capacities deemed necessary to the pursuit of a 
satisfactory life.”). 
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(“people with disabilities make me uncomfortable”172) and to pity 
(“always be nice to blind people” 173); both instances manifest in a sense 
of “otherness” and exclusion that, combined, is unique to the disabled. 
Societal perceptions and reactions are crucial to defining 
disability. Exogenous factors (such as the way mainstream societies 
create environments), rather than endogenous qualities, are what by 
and large create the disability classification.174 Much like people of 
color, people with disabilities are not inherently dissimilar from one 
another because of medically ascertainable facts. Rather, the disabled 
are placed outside the mainstream and constitute a coherent “other” 
group that society considers as being apart from the biological norm. 
Yet, separation and its social consequences are precisely what cause 
people with disabilities to be alike for group identification purposes. 
Thus, an individual with cerebral palsy (who has a genius level IQ) 
and a person with congenitally missing arms (who happens to be a 
champion marathon runner) will each be considered different from 
the mainstream in the negative sense of being less capable (as 
opposed to being stronger or smarter), and this common prejudicial 
experience in turn reinforces their membership in a disability 
classification. Put another way, disabled persons are identified as 
“disabled” and subjected to stigma that derives from membership in 
an externally created class; in turn, the collective experience of being 
treated as “disabled” creates an overall and unifying identity. 
Disability heuristics create both prejudice and group classification.175 
 
 172. People with disabilities aver that they can sense when nondisabled people are bent out 
of shape by their presence, much as gays and lesbians do. 
 173. A graphic illustration of this phenomenon (literally) appears in the autobiography of 
politically incorrect quadriplegic cartoonist John Callahan, as part of a series that he has drawn 
on “How to relate to handicapped people.” Among the behavioral don’ts are: (a) acting “over 
friendly”; (b) being “patronizing”; (c) “directing your questions to the friend of the handicapped 
person”; (d) “being over-apologetic”; and (e) “acting like Leo Buscaglia [a professor at the 
University of Southern California known for his writings on demonstrating love].” JOHN 
CALLAHAN, DON’T WORRY, HE WON’T GET FAR ON FOOT 189–99 (1989). 
 174. A particularly strong version of this assertion is that of feminist and disability rights 
advocate Susan Wendell, who alleges that “the entire physical and social organization of life” 
has been created with the notion in mind that “everyone was physically strong, as though all 
bodies were shaped the same, as though everyone could walk, hear, and see well, as though 
everyone could work and play at a pace that is not compatible with any kind of illness or pain.” 
WENDELL, supra note 161, at 39. Professor Wendell’s point, although valid, should not be 
overstated. 
 175. Several scholars have written on why group membership, as opposed to individual 
circumstance, is necessary to justify antidiscrimination protection for people with disabilities. 
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 422–68 
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This is because group identity norms almost by definition equate with 
negative stereotypes; otherwise, there would not be a need to 
eliminate civil rights violations that flow from their invocation.176 
Pandisability theory parallels earlier notions of panethnicity, and 
demonstrates how disability serves as an equally valuable socially 
constructed heuristic for determining class identity. A pandisability 
theory allows us to once more capture the commonality of class 
interest, as both unwillfully receiving and wishing to eradicate a 
particular form of group-based stigma and subordination. Just as 
prejudice and stereotype arise from misperceptions about a category 
of individuals, so too must litigation be group-based if it is to 
ameliorate those barriers. 
A central predicate to a group-based discrimination proof 
structure is that people with disabilities have a common-enough 
group identity to aggregate their interests. This is the case under class 
action law, in which collective interests must be sufficiently cohesive 
to meet the typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation 
standards. It is equally true under disparate impact doctrine, in which 
joint interests must be aligned to contrast statistical disparities with 
the majority group (in this case, workers without disabilities). Shared 
perceptions provide people with disabilities the commonality of 
interest necessary to proceed under group-based discrimination 
theories of class actions and disparate impact proof models.177 It is to 
these subjects that we now turn. 
 
(2000) (arguing that ADA coverage ought to be circumscribed to those individuals whose 
disability-related stigma subjects them to systematic disadvantage); Mark Kelman, Does 
Disability Status Matter?, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF 
THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 114, at 91, 96–99 (proposing that 
norms are best enforced as group, rather than individual, protections because the larger societal 
benefits stemming from the prevention of market discrimination relate to the incorporation of 
those groups into the social and economic mainstream). 
 176. See generally Anita Silvers, Double Consciousness, Triple Difference: Disability, Race, 
Gender and the Politics of Recognition, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND LEGAL CHANGE 
75 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 1999). 
 177. Earlier the Article focused on disparate impact first and then on the class action device, 
due to their chronology within non-disability discrimination cases. It now reverses field and 
treats the ramifications of class action disability discrimination claims before disparate impact 
theory. This is because the shared group experience, expressed through class action procedure, 
should precede and lend structure to the doctrinal application of disparate impact theory. 
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B. The Class Action Device 
At the class certification stage, courts have shifted their focus in 
race- and sex-based employment discrimination cases away from ties 
that are commonly viewed as socially constructed (as defined by 
panethnicity) and toward greater intragroup hegemony requirements. 
One by-product of this increased stringency is that Title I class actions 
have been viewed with special skepticism when analyzed under Rule 
23 criteria. However, it is not inevitable that courts should interpret 
disability-related collective actions in this manner. 
As an initial matter, Title I class actions are fundamentally like 
their classical Title VII counterparts, despite the putative assumption 
that the latter request “one-size-fits-all” remedies, whereas the 
former necessitate individualized remedies. The notion that race and 
sex classes each request univocal remedies is overstated. Within these 
classes, each member may well need a different variation of the 
generally agreed-upon relief. Returning to the hypothetical, pre-
Falcon Title VII employment discrimination class action brought 
against Big Impersonal Corporation,178 some of those women might 
challenge on disparate impact grounds. Among them might be a 
challenge to an employer’s interviewing policy that emphasizes 
aggressiveness and thereby excluded their hiring on the basis of sex; 
others may point to a seniority system that instantiated historic 
exclusion on the basis of race and precluded their promotion; still 
others may claim that they were harassed about their cultural and 
linguistic heritage, and so suffered injuries on the basis of their 
national origin; and a number may assert that their religious 
observance led to poor performance evaluations and dismissal. 
Assuming the suit is successful, at least four general policies (hiring, 
promotion, hostile work environment, and retention) will need to be 
altered.179 
 
 178. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. 
 179. We acknowledge that since the Supreme Court’s decision in General Telephone Co. v. 
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982), it has become more difficult to take an “across-the-board” 
approach to challenge employer discrimination (at least in the absence of class representatives 
who have been directly affected by each employment policy), see supra Part I.C. Even post-
Falcon, however, some courts have allowed members of one racial minority to represent 
another minority. See Ramirez v. DeCoster, 203 F.R.D. 30, 32 (D. Me. 2001) (holding that class 
representatives who were migrant farm workers of exclusively Mexican origin could represent a 
class of all Hispanics who had worked at the defendant’s egg farm); see also Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. 
of N.Y., 201 F.R.D. 326, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that a Latina woman of unspecified origin, 
an African-American woman, and an African-American man could represent a class of all African-
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More trenchantly, the application of each of those changed 
policies will be different for each of the class members. In spite of the 
shared experience of discrimination, which in turn arises from an 
external view of their shared qualities as Latinas, each of these 
individuals is unique in terms of her qualifications, qualities, and 
experiences of discrimination.180 Along the same lines, the 
individuality of ADA relief is likewise overstated. Many requests for 
accommodation dealing with physical accessibility and environmental 
design, for instance, can be commonly remedied by use of Universal 
Design principles. 
Second, although very few class actions have been brought (and 
fewer still, certified) in Title I cases, collective action is routinely seen 
in ADA cases involving discrimination in public services (under Title 
II) and privately owned places of public accommodation (under Title 
III). Title II classes have been certified for individuals with various 
mobility and/or vision disabilities challenging inaccessible sidewalks,181 
and individuals with various disabilities who were eligible under 
California’s Medicaid program and received services at a hospital that 
was slated for termination.182 Similarly, Title III class actions seeking 
to enforce public accommodation accessibility requirements are 
regularly certified for groups of diversely disabled individuals,183 even 
when those classes are defined as encompassing “all persons in the 
 
American and Latino teachers). Similar cases exist outside of employment law. See Thompson v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 216 F.R.D. 55, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (class of non-Caucasian policyholders who 
alleged racial discrimination in formation, performance, modification, and termination of insurance 
contracts in violation of § 1981); Ashe v. Bd. of Elections in N.Y., 124 F.R.D. 45, 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(class of all Black and Hispanic citizens alleging racial discrimination in voting procedures). 
 180. Parenthetically, given that it is beyond the scope of this Article, we also note that the 
preceding hypothetical does not even account for instances of multiple discrimination, where an 
individual experiences prejudice because of her membership in more than one vulnerable 
group. See, e.g., Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation 
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1371 (1988) (describing 
the cumulative effects of being African American and a woman). 
 181. Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 182. Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2004) (including urological and ancillary 
services, rehabilitation of spinal cord injuries, amputation services, services for chronic liver 
disease, post-stroke rehabilitation, services for diabetics, and pressure sore management); see 
also Armstrong v. Davis, No. 99–15152, 2000 WL 369622, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2000) (class of 
all present and future California state prison inmates and parolees with various physical and 
learning disabilities). 
 183. See, e.g., Colo. Cross-Disability Coal. v. Taco Bell Corp., 184 F.R.D. 354, 357–63 (D. 
Colo. 1999) (approving certification of a class comprised of both wheelchair and scooter users); 
Bacal v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., No. 94–6497, 1995 WL 299029, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1995) 
(granting certification for “[a]ll persons eligible for paratransit service” under the ADA). 
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United States with disabilities” excluded from one medical care 
facility,184 or “all physically handicapped persons who were denied full 
and equal access” to a ski resort.185 The uncontroversial 
acknowledgment of disability group identity as sufficient to justify 
class actions in nonemployment settings provides a clear example for 
parallel application in Title I suits.186 
What unifies the classes of disabled persons in these 
cases? Because the respective classes incorporate individuals with 
varying modes of disabilities, it cannot be said that the uniting feature 
is identical biology in the sense that each of the named individuals 
deviates from the perceived bodily norm in the same way. Instead, it 
is the confluence of policies, practices and environmental features 
under the common defendant’s control that excludes each of the class 
members from employment opportunity. Nor is every plaintiff 
affected in the same way. Uncurbed sidewalks likely affect people 
with mobility impairments, whereas it is lack of tactile bumps in the 
same pavements that impact people with visual impairments. Just as 
nuances in sidewalk construction produce sundry incommodations on 
assorted categories of disabled people, so too does the relief that each 
category of individuals will seek. Nevertheless, this class was certified 
on the ground that the complained-of discrimination (i.e., neglecting 
to account for ecumenical accessibility when constructing and 
maintaining sidewalks) sufficiently unified the class and its interests.187 
To illustrate how this principle could be incorporated into Title I 
class actions, assume that Snobb Academy, a private elementary 
school, is hiring teachers. One of the essential job requirements, in 
addition to proper educational degrees, teaching experience, personal 
charm, and references, is the ability to safely convey children out of a 
building during fire alarms (and, especially, in case of a genuine fire). 
Antonio, whose epilepsy is not readily discernable, applies for a 
 
 184. Access Now, Inc. v. AHM CGH, Inc., No. 98–3004, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14788, at 
*16 (S.D. Fla. July 12, 2000). 
 185. Leiken v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., No. S–93–505, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21281, at *10 
(E.D. Cal. June 28, 1994). 
 186. Clearly, this would be a very different than the typical ADA Title I case, which often 
focuses at the outset on whether the plaintiff actually meets the definition of disability under the 
statute. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999) (holding that plaintiffs were 
not disabled within meaning of statute because in their mitigated states, they were not 
substantially limited in a major life activity). Nevertheless, there is no salient reason why what 
can be done in Title II and III cases cannot be done in Title I cases. The ADA’s definition of 
disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000), is the same for the entire statute. 
 187. Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d 1073, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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teaching position and is offered a job. After accepting, Antonio 
reveals to the school his epileptic condition and requests, as a 
reasonable accommodation, that the strobe lights in the fire alarms 
(which can initiate epileptic seizures), be replaced with an alternative 
form of emergency illumination. Snobb Academy refuses on the 
ground that replacing the lighting will be too expensive, and hence 
unreasonable. Antonio sues. Assuming that the accommodation did 
not rise to a level of imposing an undue hardship on the school (and is 
therefore disposed of through summary judgment),188 the trial 
proceeds on the issue of whether Antonio’s requested 
accommodation was in fact reasonable. Whoever wins, the resulting 
verdict reflects the reasonableness of the non-strobe light 
accommodation. It does not, however, address whether or not Snobb 
Academy was upholding a workplace norm that adversely impacted 
other disabled individuals beyond Antonio. 
Now consider how Antonio’s case might look as a class action. 
Even under a limited view of the class certification requirements of 
typicality and adequacy of representation, Antonio should be able to 
serve as a class representative for other employees (or potential 
employees) with epilepsy who would be similarly disadvantaged by 
the strobe light system. But the class represented can be conceived of 
in an even broader manner, embracing individuals with other 
disabilities who might be similarly excluded by the strobe light 
system. People with balance difficulties, brain injuries, and certain 
visual atypicalities could similarly have been excluded from teaching 
positions. Thus, any individual with a disability who can identify being 
excluded from a vocational opportunity at Snobb Academy because 
of the strobe light alarm could participate in Antonio’s class action. 
The discrimination here alleged is the maintenance of a 
workplace feature that rightly serves the interests of teachers and 
students without disabilities, but which in doing so disserves teachers 
 
 188. Common sense would seem to indicate that the issue of reasonableness ought to 
necessitate just the type of factual inquiry that defeats motions for summary judgment, namely a 
determination by a jury based upon the set of facts presented by the opposing parties. Thus, 
granting summary judgment at this stage prevents the type of functional inquiry that appears to 
be envisioned by the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . 
to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.”). Nonetheless, it is the governing practice. See Ruth Colker, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 
(1999) (“Courts are abusing the summary judgment device . . . . [by] refusing to send ‘normative’ 
factual questions to the jury.”). 
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and students with disabilities. Although Antonio’s fellow class 
members may have different disabilities, they are unified by their 
communally experienced exclusion and social stigma. For 
commonality purposes, the common issues of fact are how Snobb 
Academy did (or did not) perceive the needs of people with 
disabilities, including what prejudices and mutual stigmas it 
associated with the disability designation, as well as the effectiveness 
and reasonableness of the requested accommodations.189 The common 
legal issue is whether accommodations appropriate for class members 
as a whole are required under the ADA.190 
Equally, this case can also satisfy the elements of typicality and 
adequacy of representation,191 which are often analyzed together.192 In 
the event that Antonio’s requested accommodation benefits other 
individuals with similar disabilities, there is a complete alignment of 
requested relief between the class representative and the class, and 
typicality should be easily met. If, as in the circumstance of the 
sidewalk case, different class members need dissimilar 
accommodations to facilitate their entry into Snobb Academy, their 
shared exclusion should still serve to certify the class.193 If the 
 
 189. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
 190. This tracks the common legal and factual issues in Title VII cases. In Reeb v. Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation, 203 F.R.D. 315 (S.D. Ohio 2001), a sex discrimination case where 
the defendant was alleged to have engaged in a general pattern or practice of discrimination 
against women by its employment actions that disproportionately harmed female employees, 
the court held that the requirement of commonality was met because the issue of whether 
defendant’s alleged practices violated Title VII was common to the class, id. at 321; see also 
Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Allegations of similar discriminatory 
employment practices, such as the use of entirely subjective personnel processes that operate to 
discriminate, satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a).”); ALBA 
CONTE & HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:10, at 283 (4th ed. 2002) 
(“Common issues of actions charging discrimination on the basis of race or sex are the presence 
of a discriminatory rule or practice and a general policy of discrimination.”). The same is true 
for ADA non-Title I cases. Anderson v. Pennsylvania Deptartment of Public Welfare, 1 F. Supp. 
2d 456 (E.D. Pa. 1998), presents a class action challenging a managed care program’s 
compliance with ADA Title II, id. at 461–62. The court rejected the defendant’s arguments that 
commonality was not met on the ground that there would be individual fact issues regarding 
each putative class member’s impairment and ability to obtain medical care. Id. at 462. 
 191. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3), (a)(4). 
 192. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982) (“The commonality and 
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge. Both serve as guideposts for determining 
whether . . . the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their 
absence.”). 
 193. Again, this is a common feature of ADA non-employment law cases. In Wyatt v. 
Poundstone, 169 F.R.D. 155 (M.D. Ala. 1995), a class of residents in state-operated facilities 
argued that defendants violated Title II of the ADA by not providing sufficient number of 
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requested remedies are too dissimilar, subclasses may be 
appropriate.194 
When considering what qualities unify groups for purposes of 
group-based discrimination actions, courts routinely recognize 
financial interests as sufficient to certify a class. Consider securities 
fraud cases, which are often brought as class actions and regularly 
certified, despite the defendant’s conduct having affected the class 
members in different ways.195 The typicality element of Rule 23 
usually is met in these cases even when the named plaintiffs bought 
numerous categories of stock,196 or there were differences in overall 
damage amounts;197 class members purchased stock in dissimilar 
manners (for example, at separate times or relying on distinct 
documents),198 were diverse types of investors,199 and varied greatly in 
 
community-based placements, id. at 158. Defendants argued that the class should be decertified 
because it was divided between individuals who advocated community placement of residents 
and those that did not. Id. at 160. The court rejected this argument. Id. at 162. 
 194. See, e.g., Quigley v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 74, 84 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (holding, in 
an employment discrimination action, that conflict over relief between the plaintiff and the class 
representative could be resolved by subclasses when the proper time arose). 
 195. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1217–27 (9th ed. 2003) (discussing securities litigation, the frequency of class 
actions, and how members of the same class may have been affected in different ways). See 
generally CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 190, at ch. 7 (discussing class determination generally 
and citing many securities cases that had been properly certified). 
 196. Endo v. Albertine, 147 F.R.D. 164, 167–69 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding the typicality 
requirement was met where the named plaintiffs bought only Class A common stock whereas 
the class members purchased debentures and notes as well as common stock). 
 197. See, e.g., Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 640 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that although the 
named plaintiff made money from the relevant investment while other class members claimed 
losses, class certification was not necessarily defeated); Clark v. Cameron-Brown Co., 72 F.R.D. 
48, 53 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (“[A] difference in damages between [members] . . . of the proposed 
class . . . does not affect the proper class formation.”). 
 198. See, e.g., Spicer v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc., 1990 WL 16983, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
31, 1990) (“[T]he fact differences relating to the price at which each series traded do not 
undermine typicality . . . .”). 
 199. See In re Mellon Bank S’holder Litig., 120 F.R.D. 35, 37 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that 
the typicality requirement was met even though the shareholder class contained institutional 
investors who bought stock based on internally developed research); Backman v. Polaroid 
Corp., No. 79-1031-MC, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17640, at *6 (D. Mass. July 16, 1982) (“While 
the plaintiffs’ knowledge and their methods of making trading decisions may differ from those 
of the class of investors which they seek to represent, those differences do not make plaintiffs 
atypical or inadequate representatives.”); Greenfield v. Flying Diamond Oil Corp., No. 78 Ci. 
3723, 1981 WL 1621, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1981) (finding that the claims of arbitrageurs were 
not legally different from other shareholders). 
03__STEIN_WATERSTONE.DOC 1/11/2007  10:45 AM 
908 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:861 
the misrepresentation that influenced their purchases.200 This is 
because the underlying inquiry for typicality was whether the same 
alleged unlawful conduct affected both the named plaintiff and the 
class seeking to be represented.201 Similarly, variations in the manner 
in which class members relied on the alleged misrepresentation do 
not defeat the class certification requirement of adequacy of 
representation.202 What is clear is that within securities law, a 
defendant’s conduct does not have to affect every class member in the 
same way. Instead, the umbrella covering the entire class is the 
alleged unlawful conduct that has impacted every class member. 
Specific requests for monetary relief are, however, a poor proxy 
for the deeper social dynamics that unify groups of individuals. 
Rather than a onetime financial loss, it is shared human experience 
that is far more significant in defining common identity. Securities 
fraud plaintiffs are united only in the sense that they feel collectively 
aggrieved to the point of seeking financial redress. Beyond the 
boundaries of the suit, these individuals may not (and need not) share 
any identity characteristics. For these claimants, the class action 
procedure defines their joint identity. By contrast, pandisability (and 
panethnicity) plaintiffs are bound together by their respective 
 
 200. See, e.g., Priest v. Zayre Corp., 118 F.R.D. 552, 555 (D. Mass. 1988) (“The fact that 
plaintiff’s investment decisions were influenced by his own subjective preferences and 
determined in part by a computer program incorporating a number of factors does not render 
him atypical.” (footnote omitted)); Baum v. Centronics Data Computer Corp., No. C85-363-L, 
1986 WL 15784, at *2 (D.N.H. May 15, 1986) (“Reliance on the advice of others will not defeat 
typicality if the information from the third parties is based on the alleged misrepresentations 
that form the basis of plaintiffs’ action.”). 
 201. See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 190, § 22:24 (“Under this view, the typicality 
prerequisite may be satisfied though varying fact patterns may underlie individual claims.”); see 
also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968) (suggesting that the trial court could 
find that the typicality requirement was met in a case charging a company with inflating its stock 
price by issuing false prospectuses, even though the named plaintiffs bought shares relying on a 
third prospectus, not on the prior two, as the other plaintiffs had done); Sargent v. Genesco, 
Inc., 75 F.R.D. 79, 83 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (holding that the typicality requirement was met despite 
the existence of a subclass because all of the plaintiffs’ claims “are premised on the same 
theories and will survive or fall to the same defenses”). 
 202. See, e.g., Fox v. Equimark Corp., No. 90-1504, 1994 WL 560994, at *5 (W.D. Pa. July 18, 
1994) (holding that reliance, by the plaintiffs, on a Wall Street Journal article rather than on 
defendant’s alleged misrepresentation did not render representation inadequate); Fritesch v. 
Refco, Inc., No. 92 C 6844, 1994 WL 10014, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1994) (determining that 
significant differences in content prospectuses between class representatives and some class 
members did not render representation inadequate); Priest, 118 F.R.D. at 555 (concluding that 
the named plaintiff’s reliance on factors other than the alleged misrepresentations did not 
undermine his adequacy as a class representative). 
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experiences of social stigma and subordination. They may coalesce 
around the focal point of an employer’s particular policy or practice 
for litigation purposes, but their essential identities as people with 
disabilities (or persons of color) are independent of these claims. The 
social responses that the group undergoes while mediating society 
both precede and follow any judicial interaction. Put concretely, 
disabled people as a whole are subjected to differential treatment and 
social exclusion throughout their lives because of social constructs 
created by the able-bodied majority, and identify with one another 
because of this occurrence. It is this shared life experience that 
defines both their real world, as well as their legally constructed 
identities. 
Finally, it bears noting that certifying a class of people with 
diverse disabilities that has been affected by a common set of 
attitudes and discriminatory behaviors is consistent with the history 
underlying the class action device. As demonstrated by the 
scholarship of Stephen Yeazell,203 the procedure arose as an expedient 
way to adjudicate the common interests of an already socially 
constructed group.204 The earliest forms of collective action that 
Professor Yeazell documents occurred on behalf of villagers suing 
individuals or other villages for grievances impacting the village as a 
whole,205 and tenants challenging the amount that the lord of the 
manor could exact for permitting succession to a tenancy.206 The 
 
 203. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS 
ACTION (1987); Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action: Part I: The 
Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 514 (1980) [hereinafter Yeazell, From 
Group Litigation to Class Action: Part I]; Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class 
Action: Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067 (1980); Stephen C. 
Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. 
L. REV. 866 (1977). 
 204. See YEAZELL, supra note 203, at 40 (“[M]ost medieval group litigation involved groups 
whose organization antedated the lawsuit itself . . . . Unlike some modern collective litigation, 
medieval group litigation did not overcome the difficulties of organizing a group for collective 
action. That task had already been done.”). 
 205. Id. at 38–39 (discussing a 1199 case wherein the rector of Barkway “sued the 
parishioners of Nuthamstead, a Hertfordshire village, in a suit involving his entitlement to 
certain offerings and theirs to daily services of mass,” and a different case a century later where 
“three villagers, ‘for themselves and for the whole community of the vill of Helpingham,’ sued 
two named persons ‘and the whole community of the town of Donington’ . . . for the alleged 
failure of the [defendant] villagers to assist the Helpingham villagers in repairing local dikes”). 
 206. See Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action: Part I, supra note 203, at 516–18 
(noting how this policy applied to all tenants and evolved into “early group litigation because 
the custom in question was one theoretically applicable to all tenants holding under similar 
circumstances”). 
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socially constructed bonds amongst the villagers and tenants provided 
the necessary community of interest for the group-based litigation.207 
Indeed, the litigation itself was a fairly insignificant unifying force for 
the group, given the breadth of their shared communal identity.208 The 
idea of a litigation campaign forming the community of interest for 
the group is of a distinctively more recent vintage. We therefore agree 
with Professor Yeazell that for “many modern classes the class 
members are not a social group but simply those members of society 
who share some hypothesized interest.”209 
C. Challenging Workplace Norms 
Just as the class action device is the legal procedure through 
which to challenge disability-related employment discrimination, 
disparate impact law provides the theoretical framework for 
challenging those workplace hierarchies. Classically, disparate impact 
litigation highlights statistical disparities in an occupational 
demographic profile that are traceable to an employer’s policies or 
practices. 
Absent direct evidence of a facially discriminatory practice, for 
example a blanket policy of not considering deaf workers for 
employment positions,210 circumstantial evidence forms the basis for a 
prima facie case of discrimination and shifts the burden to employers 
of proving that their business practices have a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory purpose.211 In other words, plaintiffs claim that due 
 
 207. See YEAZELL, supra note 203, at 46–57 (describing both the villagers’ common status 
and the organization of village life as unifying circumstances). 
 208. Id. at 57 (“[T]o the extent that the issues at stake in such litigation involved incidents of 
status rather than claims of individual right, group litigation seemed inevitable rather than 
remarkable.”); id. (“[U]nlike the modern class action, medieval group litigation did not, in itself, 
alter the relations of power between the group and its adversary.”). 
 209. Id.; see also Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action: Part I, supra note 203, at 
516–20 (discussing the move from social entities to litigative units). 
 210. See Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1182 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination when a call center in the Philippines 
was set up to handle only non-vocal communication and the company did not consider people 
with deafness for employment). 
 211. E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (giving the burden 
of proof structure for cases involving circumstantial proof, whereby a plaintiff establishes a 
prima facie case of discrimination, which shifts the burden to the defendant to present a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action, which in turn shifts 
the burden back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason is a 
pretext for discrimination). In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), the Court 
clarified that direct evidence of discrimination is not required to shift the burden of proof to the 
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to the effects of a particular practice of the employer, something is 
wrong with the overall employment snapshot—people of color apply, 
but are not hired; women are hired, but not promoted—and frame 
this discriminatory picture within statistical evidence of relevant labor 
market demographics.212 Because disparate impact law is dependent 
on asserting statistical groupwide disparities (“no/very few people 
who resemble me/us have been granted employment opportunities by 
the defendant”), it cannot be theoretically conceived of as atomistic. 
Even when brought by a lone claimant,213 disparate impact cases must 
be understood in terms of questioning larger structured relationships 
that affect a broader number of individuals and that in turn challenge 
those hierarchies.214 
Consequently, disparate impact theory as applied to failure to 
accommodate cases is necessary to challenge facially neutral policies 
and practices that have a disproportionately negative effect on people 
with disabilities. Even commentators who are skeptical of disparate 
impact litigation have noted its successes in eliminating formal 
policies that contribute to the unequal exclusion of racial minorities 
and women.215 The existing literature and case law, however, has not 
 
defendant in a mixed-motive discrimination case, i.e., where legitimate and illegitimate reasons 
motivated the employment action, id. at 101–02; see Charles Sullivan, Disparate Impact: 
Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911 (2005) (arguing that it 
would be a mistake for Desert Palace to create a renewed emphasis by academics and courts on 
disparate treatment litigation). 
 212. Determining the appropriate baseline demographic is at the heart of this econometric 
pursuit. Courts have divided over whether plaintiffs ought to focus on actual applicants, the 
available labor pool within geographic proximity, or national statistics. See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 337 (1977) (comparing the proportion of minority 
workers employed as over-the-road drivers to the proportion of minorities in the national 
population); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977) (using the 
proportion of blacks in the relevant labor market as a baseline for evaluating a school district’s 
hiring practices); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 347–48 (1977) (White, J., concurring) 
(noting the importance of the applicant pool data in Hazelwood, supra). 
 213. See Heagney v. Univ. of Wash., 642 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Although the 
disparate impact theory is ordinarily asserted in class actions, an individual claimant may seek 
relief under such a theory as well.”), overruled on other grounds, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing 
Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 214. For a sociological account of this argument, see Mark Gould, Law and Sociology: Some 
Consequences for the Law of Employment Discrimination Deriving from the Sociological 
Reconstruction of Economic Theory, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1517 (1992). 
 215. See Selmi, supra note 5, at 754–55 (noting that disparate impact theory, despite its 
limitations, has had some successes eliminating discriminatory written tests); see also Tristin K. 
Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate 
Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 137 (2003) (“[D]isparate impact theory has 
proven an invaluable tool for reducing employer reliance on job requirements that are 
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focused on this most elemental application of disparate impact theory 
to ADA Title I cases. We therefore turn to this untapped potential. 
Employers are unlikely to formally and overtly bar disabled 
employees, as with the “no deaf worker” policy described at the 
beginning of this Section.216 Instead, exclusion is more likely to follow 
the course seen in Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal,217 in which Chevron 
required healthy workers,218 or the recommended Wal-Mart policy 
quoted at the beginning of the Article that workers be required to 
engage in job-unrelated “physical activity” in order to wean away 
“unhealthy applicants.”219 To be fair (and putting to the side for the 
moment the irrelevance of motive to related legal claims), employers 
may promulgate these policies in an effort to promote what they view 
as neutral and cost-effective job descriptions. If questioned, they 
might justify their actions along the following lines: “It is too bad that 
the disabled employees are not as capable and cost-effective (i.e., 
qualified) as nondisabled ones, but that is both unavoidable and 
unrelated to any morally incorrect action. We did not construct these 
facilities, and if we did, we only did so according to established norms. 
Moreover, the job descriptions and criteria reflect what we have 
learned from experience as being necessary. We would have been 
 
unrelated to job performance but that stand in the way of minority progress. Without such a 
tool, employers would have been free to adopt facially neutral job requirements that maintained 
the exclusion of blacks and minorities from vast areas of employment.”). 
 216. Cases involving these more subtle situations often fall within the realm of disparate 
treatment claims, which are easier to handle. For a discussion of current forms of disparate 
treatment, see Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 849–50 (arguing that present day disparate treatment 
often takes the form of either rational statistical discrimination, “in which employers rationally 
use protected-class status as a proxy for lower productivity,” or cost-based discrimination, where 
employers discriminate based on “the costs [they] believe they will incur in the course of 
integrating a firm or in managing the conflicts that inevitably arise in a diverse workforce”). 
 217. Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002). 
 218. Id. at 74. Mario Echazabal was denied employment by Chevron because Chevron 
believed the job would exacerbate his hepatitis. Id. at 76. The Court agreed, holding that Title I 
allows employers to decide whether qualified people with disabilities should be excluded from 
the workplace based on the employer’s conclusion that they create a direct threat of harm solely 
to themselves. Id. at 74. Although the plaintiffs in Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), 
twin sisters with myopic vision, were not covered by the ADA’s definition of disability, id. at 
489, the policy at issue—a broad policy excluding pilots with a particular level of uncorrected 
vision—is another example of the type of policy that could be challenged under disparate 
impact law, but to date has not been. 
 219. See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also Randy Dotinga, Can Boss Insist on 
Healthy Habits?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 11, 2006, at 15 (“In 2006, Weyco employees 
who refuse to take mandated medical tests and physical examinations will see their monthly 
health insurance premiums jump by $65. By next year, their annual insurance bills will grow by 
more than $1,000 if they still fail to follow instructions.”). 
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pleased to employ disabled workers,” they might aver. “It isn’t our 
fault they were unable to meet our criteria.” Nevertheless, the result 
is unnecessary and systemic exclusion. 
Along the same lines, employers might not consider, as an initial 
matter, that disabled persons ought to equally participate in the 
employment sector. Much as the circumstances of people of color and 
women were once ignored in the workplace, employers either create 
or continue to maintain physical and administrative environments 
that exclude those with disabilities. As with historical race- and sex-
based exclusion, many embedded policies and practices obstructing 
the disabled are based on the assumption that, despite their biology, 
new entrants to the work force should interact with their environment 
in the same way as traditional groups.220 Whereas previous restrictions 
on participation were based on notions that people of color should 
not intermingle with whites (because of animus), and that women as 
workers needed limitations that were responsive to their frailties (due 
to paternalism),221 historic treatment of people with disabilities lends 
itself to social incredulity about their workplace participation.222 Each 
social convention yields a misperception that the respective workers 
are “inauthentic.”223 Traditional failure to accommodate cases are not 
structured to reach, in a systemic fashion, this more subtle type of 
workplace exclusion.224 
Returning to the Snobb Academy example presented in the 
previous Section, assume that Antonio forgoes pursuing a typical 
ADA failure to accommodate suit, of the sort that would allege that 
 
 220. “As a practical matter, persons with disabilities are far more likely than are blacks or 
women to regularly face built-in headwinds in the form of performance standards, job structure, 
or workplace environment.” Crossley, supra note 140, at 918. See generally O’BRIEN, supra note 
160 (detailing instances where disabled workers must either fit into existing norms or be 
excluded). 
 221. This point is discussed in greater detail in Stein, supra note 154, at 608–16. 
 222. This is true to the extent that several Supreme Court Justices seem to deny the ADA’s 
role as a civil rights statute. Perhaps the most obvious example is Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). Instead of evaluating the circumstances that caused the suit, or referencing the 
notion of rights, Justice Kennedy characterized the issue as one that invoked a wrestling match 
between “our own human instincts” on the one hand, and “the better angels of our nature” that 
sympathize for “those disadvantaged by mental or physical impairments,” on the other. Id. at 
375–76. 
 223. For a discussion of “inauthentic workers,” see Schultz, supra note 136, at 1919–28. 
 224. Congress recognized this action as “benign” paternalism. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) 
(2000) (recognizing “overprotective rules and policies” as a form of discrimination); see also 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85 (2002). 
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the Academy’s refusal to alter the fire alarm system precluded his 
employment prospects. Instead, using disparate impact theory 
Antonio presents statistical evidence of a near-complete absence of 
people with disabilities at Snobb Academy. Rather than being limited 
to proving the impact of the denial of a specific accommodation, 
Antonio has made a prima facie case that some official policy or 
practice has made Snobb Academy an unwelcoming employer for 
disabled persons.225 The strobe lights may have caused other 
individuals with disabilities to be rejected for the same position, or 
they may have discouraged other disabled persons from applying. 
Regardless, Antonio’s suit (as discussed previously,226 brought as a 
class action with him as the class representative) has gained leverage 
by broadly challenging the dearth of other employees with 
disabilities. As a group-based, statistically supported disparate impact 
suit, Antonio can examine the school’s history (or lack thereof) of 
employing teachers and other employees with disabilities.227 Some 
may have had visibly identifiable disabilities. Others, like Antonio, 
may have impairments that are harder to detect. Antonio can also 
demonstrate that the requested accommodation (changing the 
existing method of alerting people of an emergency) would also 
benefit individuals with disabilities who have epilepsy and various 
brain or vision impairments.228 
 
 225. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (holding that the 
disparity caused by subjective employment criteria sufficed to establish the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case). Antonio would argue that the Title I claims based on failure to accommodate are 
doctrinally cognizable under a disparate impact theory, and that nothing in Raytheon suggests to 
the contrary. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 226. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text. 
 227. See, e.g., NAACP v. Town of E. Haven, 70 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 1995) (directing the 
district court, on remand, in a disparate impact case, to consider the employer’s defense in light 
of the plaintiff’s showing of the “inexorable zero”). 
 228. Conceptually, Antonio would argue that the strobe light is an environmental feature 
that creates two groups—those without disabilities that are not affected by it, and people with 
disabilities who are adversely affected. But not every person with a disability will be 
disadvantaged by the strobe light. Deaf employees, for example, might benefit. Doctrinally, 
then, under existing disparate impact law, Antonio will need to show that the strobe light has 
deterred a certain subgroup of people with disabilities from employment. Some courts have held 
this permissible under the ADEA. See Graffam v. Scott Paper Co., 848 F. Supp. 1, 4–5 (D. Me. 
1994) (“[I]t is permissible, under the ADEA, for Plaintiffs’ [sic] to show that an employer’s 
actions had a disparate impact on a subgroup of individuals within the protected class.”); see 
also Klein v. Sec’y of Transp., 807 F. Supp. 1517, 1524 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (holding that the 
plaintiff prevailed after proving that the hiring practices of the FAA “had a definite disparate 
impact on qualified applicants over the age of fifty”); EEOC v. Borden’s, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 
1095, 1098–99 (D. Ariz. 1982) (holding that an employer’s “severance pay policy did have an 
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Working through the Snobb Academy hypothetical demonstrates 
how ADA reasonable accommodation theory is more akin to Title 
VII disparate impact law than most commentators acknowledge.229 To 
further demonstrate this point, Christine Jolls offers the following five 
examples of facially neutral (1) no-beard rules that disparately impact 
African American males whose skin conditions preclude regular 
shaving;230 (2) job selection criteria that tend to exclude women 
(sometimes for aggression, sometime for passivity)231 and racial groups 
(chiefly, standardized ability tests);232 (3) English-only rules that 
adversely effect individuals with alternative national origins;233 (4) 
refusals of non-FMLA pregnancy leave time requests disparately 
impacting women who elect to bear children;234 and (5) actions 
effectuating policies on the ground of business necessity that tend to 
exclude members of protected groups.235 Professor Jolls demonstrates 
that eviscerating disparate impact in each of five “cases of 
equivalence” in turn necessitated the provision of an accommodation-
type remedy.236 
Transforming Professor Jolls’s non-ADA related 
accommodation examples to a parallel disability context (something 
that Jolls herself does not do), these instances could now include, 
respectively, facially neutral (1) rules on the use of physically 
inaccessible venues when alternative accessible venues are available 
 
adverse disparate impact on those employees over fifty-five years of age”). Other courts have 
held it is not. See Lowe v. Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1372–73 (2d Cir. 
1989) (rejecting appellants’ use of sub-groups, stating that “[w]e find no support in the case law 
or in the ADEA for the approach to disparate impact analysis appellants advocate”); see also 
EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The EEOC is thus 
asking us to expand our recognition of disparate-impact claims under the ADEA to include 
claims on behalf of subgroups of the protected class. We decline to do so.”). Particularly with 
the ADA, we believe that the former position is appropriate. Courts have readily acknowledged 
subgroups of people with disabilities in other contexts, see supra note 104, and the limits of 
statistical analysis will render disparate impact cases impossible to prove where subgroups are 
too small to obtain statistical results, see Graffam, 848 F. Supp. at 4 n.6 (“[The] limits of 
statistical analysis will render disparate impact cases impossible to prove where subgroups are 
too small to obtain reliable statistical results.”). 
 229. This overlap was first noted by Christine Jolls. See Jolls, supra note 108. 
 230. Id. at 653 (citing Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 939 F.2d 610, 611–12 (8th Cir. 1991)). 
 231. Id. at 656 (citing Lanning v. Se. Pa. Trans. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 482–83 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 232. Id. at 657 (citing Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28, 30 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 233. Id. at 658 (citing EEOC v. Synchro-Start Prods., Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 911, 912 (N.D. Ill. 
1999)). 
 234. Id. at 661 (citing EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1991)). 
 235. Id. at 665 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 648–49 (1989)). 
 236. Id. at 652–66. 
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(such as placing a workstation up a flight of stairs where it is 
dangerous for someone with a balance disorder); (2) job selection 
criteria that tend to exclude people with disabilities, for example the 
use of physical ability (e.g., asking a quadriplegic bank teller to lift 
weights) and/or standardized testing (for instance, written tests that 
severely dyslexic persons may not be able to perceive); (3) rules that 
require the use of specific systems that adversely affect individuals 
using alternative formats (i.e., visually impaired people who use 
Braille, computerized readers, or large print); (4) refusals of leave 
time or alternative work venue requests (like telecommuting by 
people with ulcerative bedsores); and (5) general actions effectuating 
policies on the ground of business necessity (for example, not 
allowing a schizophrenic to take a ten minute respite to refocus her 
attention and eliminate delusional distractions). 
Two pertinent themes are common to the foregoing sets of 
examples. In every situation a court will challenge whether a given 
work policy was in fact necessary to a particular business; and those 
employers who are compelled to, will hire or retain workers they 
previously viewed as less capable.237 Here, the confluence between the 
statutes is clear. Correspondingly, the possible argument that a one-
size-fits-all remedy prevails for Title VII, but not Title I, is 
unconvincing.238 Returning to some of the preceding examples, a class-
based disparate impact challenge to non-shaving rules benefits more 
than African American men with pseudofoliliculitis barbea; it also 
benefits Sikh, Muslim, and Jewish men who do not shave for religious 
reasons. Changing interview and promotion modalities protects not 
only feminine, nonaggressive women, but also passive men. Nor is 
there a Title VII/Title I divide. Eliminating a spoken English-only 
rule benefits non-English speakers and deaf persons (who write or 
can be sign interpreted). Inversely, eliminating irrelevant medical 
criteria (e.g., regular blood pressure as a criteria for the exciting job 
of accountant) helps both the disabled and African American men 
who historically have high blood pressure. 
In this way, applying even basic disparate impact theory would 
enable people with disabilities to challenge the type of “neutral” 
workplace policies and practices that Title VII has had success 
 
 237. A third theme, beyond the scope of this Article, is that all employers will be required to 
bear additional costs when those policies causing disparate impact are abnegated. This is 
discussed in Stein, supra note 154. 
 238. See supra text accompanying notes 178–79. 
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eliminating for women and racial minorities. Admittedly, there is less 
consensus on whether subtler workplace barriers (referred to as 
“structural” barriers or part of “workplace culture”) are susceptible 
to disparate impact challenges.239 The scholarship addressing this 
divide relies heavily on social science research showing the influence 
of unconscious biases on an increasingly decentralized workplace.240 
To demonstrate the difference in successfully applying disparate 
impact claims to workplace culture issues, consider the law firm 
summer associate example discussed earlier in the Article.241 A 
summer associate with a disability who is precluded from 
participating in law firm lunches, softball games, or dinners at 
(perhaps inaccessible) partners’ houses may be viewed as not being “a 
team player.”242 These occupational norms create an inhospitable job 
environment for people with disabilities, yet are exactly the types of 
workplace culture issues Title VII disparate impact law has not had 
much success in challenging. Similarly, to the extent Antonio is able 
to demonstrate a specific policy or practice creating statistical 
disparities in Snobb Academy’s hiring and retention history regarding 
disabled workers, he may be able to achieve some restructuring of the 
workplace. But, as noted by commentators, the more entrenched 
 
 239. See supra notes 5–6. 
 240. See Jody David Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers 
Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 751–59 (1995) (describing the formation and 
manifestation of an unconscious social bias concerning race and sex); see also Nilanjana 
Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral 
Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 147 (2004) (detailing how implicit biases against women 
and minorities remain widespread); Green, supra note 215, at 99–104 (discussing the “shift in 
the operation of bias from the blatant to the more subtle and complex”); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Context of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186–1217 (1995) (discussing 
psychological theories of racism and arguing that “disparate treatment does not necessarily 
manifest discriminatory notice or intent, but a motive or intent to discriminate must be present 
to prevent it”); Anne Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Opportunity, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 587, 602–12 (2000) (explaining the shift in American society from an overt racism 
to an unconscious, difficult-to-perceive racism, and concluding that in light of this shift, “[i]t is a 
mistake . . . to then conclude that discrimination no longer affects the employment opportunities 
of blacks and women”); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of 
the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 597–613 
(2001) (detailing the changing nature of discrimination in the workplace). 
 241. See supra note 8. 
 242. Michelle Travis discusses one such norm, which she terms “workplace essentialism,” 
meaning that a “good job” includes strong preferences for “full-time work with very long hours 
or unlimited overtime, rigid work schedules for core work hours, uninterrupted worklife 
performance” and performance at a central location. Travis, supra note 6, at 9–10. 
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issues of the school’s culture and unstated workplace norms, 
symptomatic of deeper attitudes and hidden biases about disability, 
have proven elusive under existing Title VII disparate impact law in 
the race and sex context.243 
Heretofore unaddressed in the literature is the issue of how these 
more deeply entrenched norms and current workplace realities affect 
the labor market participation of disabled workers. Technological 
advances and increasingly horizontal hierarchies are evolving the way 
that all people, including those with disabilities, work.244 One might 
expect commentators who are chary about disparate impact’s 
potential to eliminate embedded workplace norms in the Title VII 
context to feel it equally limited when applied to the ADA. Although 
we take to heart the caveats raised by the nihilists as to Title VII, to 
move the debate forward we sketch an affirmative vision of what this 
theory can mean when applied to the ADA. As George Rutherglen 
notes, disparate impact law has an individualized history within the 
context of different civil rights statutes.245 Beyond the basic type of 
disparate application sketched out in the preceding paragraph, an 
even greater ambition is to reach more deeply entrenched norms. We 
turn now to that aspiration. 
There are reasons to believe that, even within the parameters of 
the existing restrictive race- and sex-based disparate impact doctrine, 
disability-based disparate impact theory stands a better chance at 
reaching these difficult workplace-norm barriers. The types of 
accommodations requested in disability cases often relate directly to 
the way jobs are performed. Accommodations like workplace 
 
 243. See Green, supra note 6, at 656 (arguing that Title VII’s “particular employment 
practice” provision limits its ability to target workplace culture); see also Bagenstos, supra note 
5, at 17 (arguing that the same provision limits the ability of disparate impact to restructure 
workplaces). 
 244. See, e.g., Letter from Peggy Mastroianni, Assistant Legal Counsel, Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm’n (Oct. 27, 2005), available at http://www.cupahr.org/publicpolicy/ 
Washington_insider/files/BO2986.PDF (last visited Oct. 19, 2006) (focusing on the potential for 
ADA discrimination in Internet recruitment and hiring); see also WILLIAM ERICKSON, A 
REVIEW OF SELECTED E-RECRUITING WEBSITES: DISABILITY ACCESSIBILITY 
CONSIDERATIONS (2002), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/edicollect/95. See generally 
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (discussing, in particular, the importance of peer review, 
telecommuting, and the growing prominence of the Internet in workplace recruitment and 
hiring). 
 245. See Rutherglen, supra note 141, at 2314–23 (exploring the development of disparate 
impact theory under Title VII, ADEA, Voting Rights Act, and ADA). 
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attendance and schedule modifications,246 job reassignment,247 creating 
a pool of light duty positions,248 purchasing equipment or modifying 
existing equipment enabling an employee with a disability to perform 
essential job functions,249 and provision of interpreters and job 
coaches250 fundamentally impact the pragmatic modalities of job 
performance. Accordingly, their modification goes directly to issues 
of workplace culture, defined elsewhere as “a process of social 
interaction and impression management, the social creation of a set of 
practices that signal membership in a group.”251 Workplace culture 
lies in the “rituals of day-to-day conformity.”252 Disability 
accommodations (unlike, for example, the high school requirement in 
Griggs253) require changes in the daily process of job performance. 
Over time, these emendations gently guide supervisors and coworkers 
toward a greater acceptance and understanding of the justice of 
varying the workplace in a way that existing race- or sex-based 
policies have not yet captured.254 
Moreover, statutory factors unique to the ADA may make it 
even better suited than Title VII to challenge the barriers inherent in 
the modern workplace through disparate impact theory. Unlike Title 
VII, Title I requires an interactive dialogue between the employer 
 
 246. See Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e will not say 
that attendance is an essential function of every employment position . . . .”). 
 247. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The ADA’s 
list of reasonable accommodations specifically refers to ‘reassignment to a vacant position.’”). 
 248. See Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 696 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Our case 
law and the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA have approved of an employer’s offer of light-
duty assignments as a reasonable accommodation for injured workers.”). 
 249. See Heather Ritchie & Peter Blanck, The Promise of the Internet for Disability: A Study 
of Online Services and Web Site Accessibility of Centers for Independent Living Web Sites, 20 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5–10 (2003) (noting how new, Internet-based technology has revolutionized 
the range of available accommodations). 
 250. See EEOC v. Hertz, No. 96-72421, 1998 WL 5694, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 1998) 
(noting that providing a temporary job coach to assist in job training might be a reasonable 
accommodation); see also Miami Univ. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 726 N.E.2d 1032, 1042 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the accommodation of a job coach was reasonable for a 
plaintiff suffering from mental retardation who did not require job coaching beyond the first 
week or so in any of her previous jobs). 
 251. Green, supra note 6, at 627. 
 252. JUDITH S. MCILWEE & J. GREGG ROBINSON, WOMEN IN ENGINEERING: GENDER, 
POWER, AND WORKPLACE CULTURE 17 (1992). 
 253. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
 254. Michelle Travis sounds a similar optimistic note about the potential for the ADA to 
change traditional notions of workplace essentialism. See Travis, supra note 6, at 46. 
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and the applicant or employee requesting an accommodation.255 This 
process creates an initial opportunity for an exchange of information 
between the employer and employee that does not arise in the race 
and sex context.256 More importantly, from a disparate impact 
standpoint, this dialogue takes away an employer’s ability to claim 
that passivity (that is, not taking active steps) is not a “particular 
employment practice” and therefore outside the purview of Title VII 
disparate impact law. To commentators’ chagrin, this has proven a 
limiting factor in restructuring structural relationships based on race 
and gender.257 Under the ADA, the employer is forced into a choice—
to make or not make the accommodation. This choice becomes the 
employment action that is later challengeable under disparate impact 
law.258 
By freeing ourselves of restrictive disparate impact doctrine 
(particularly the “particular employment practice” requirement), 
these types of cases can be even more successful in combating deeper 
exclusionary workplace norms.259 If Antonio, for example, was able to 
proceed under an earlier race and sex based disparate impact 
paradigm, he could use the combination of class action law and 
disparate impact law to challenge multiple workplace policies—both 
 
 255. At least one circuit has gone so far as to hold that an employer who does not engage in 
the interactive process may be precluded from obtaining summary judgment on a failure to 
accommodate claim. See Barnett v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 
banc), vacated on other grounds, 535 U.S. 391, 407 (2002). 
 256. The interactive process also provides an opportunity for employers to voluntarily 
comply with the ADA, whether from concerns of litigation costs or from a desire to increase 
workplace diversity. 
 257. See Green, supra note 6, at 654–57 (“[C]ourts have held that an employer’s ‘passive 
reliance’ on relational means of exclusion is not subject to disparate impact attack.” (quoting 
EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 298 (7th Cir. 1991))); see also Sullivan, 
supra note 6, at 55 (“‘Passive reliance’ on employee action is not an employer policy for 
purposes of disparate impact analysis.” (quoting Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d at 
298)). However, in DeClue v. Central Illinois Light Co., 223 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2000), the plaintiff 
challenged an employer’s failure to provide restroom facilities. Although the court failed to find 
that this constituted sexual harassment, it did suggest that “insofar as absence of restroom 
facilities deters women . . . but not men from seeking or holding a particular type of job . . . the 
absence may violate Title VII” under an impact theory. Id. at 436. Sullivan, supra note 6, 
correctly suggests that this could be a particularly broad use of impact theory, id. at 55. 
 258. See Council 31, Am. Fed’n of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Ward, 978 F.2d 373, 
377 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the idea that a single decision by an employer is beyond disparate 
analysis because “almost any repeated course of conduct can be traced back to a single 
decision”). 
 259. Although perhaps aspirational, this is certainly not doctrinally precluded. As discussed 
earlier, see supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text, unlike Title VII, there is a near complete 
absence of case law explaining and applying disparate impact law to ADA Title I claims. 
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obvious and hidden—that contribute to an inhospitable working 
environment for people with disabilities.260 Antonio could also 
represent, and show statistical proof, that various communities of 
people with disabilities were disadvantaged by this workplace 
environment.261 Yet until courts and commentators take the concept 
of pandisability to heart, these and other benefits of group-based 
discrimination theories for workers with disabilities will remain 
unrealized. Also lost will be the potential for disability-related claims 
that stimulate workplace culture challenges in the broader Title VII 
context. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress’s impetus for passing Title VII (and then amending it in 
1991) was strikingly similar to that underlying enactment of the 
ADA’s employment provisions. In both cases, Congress recognized 
the need to eliminate barriers that historically had excluded groups 
from the workplace. Within the context of race and sex, however, 
there existed a period wherein the courts were an active partner in 
realizing Title VII’s aspirations. Crucial to this effort were group-
based discrimination theories that were supported by disparate 
impact theory and the class action device. A parallel circumstance has 
not (yet) existed in regard to the ADA. Indeed, individual claims to 
accommodate specific impairments in particular jobs have all but 
eclipsed a coherent theory of disability-related disparate impact law. 
This absence in turn reinforces the erroneous notion that the statute’s 
individualized assessment principle militates against group-based 
theories. Taking advantage of the relatively blank slate of writing on 
group-based disability discrimination, this Article offers an 
alternative and intrepid vision of the ADA’s potential for 
transforming workplace environments. 
This Article challenged the exclusion of disability-based 
employment discrimination claims from group-based theories, and in 
so doing advocated for applying disparate impact theory to what have 
 
 260. See, e.g., Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 680 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (N.D. Cal. 1987) 
(holding that excluding blacks and Hispanics from owning company shares allowed plaintiffs to 
win on a disparate impact theory); Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238, 1239–40 (N.D. Cal. 1970) 
(challenging, in a class action disparate impact case, an employer’s testing, interview, and 
background investigation procedures which together contributed to white males being favored 
in the workplace over non-Caucasians). 
 261. See supra notes 35–45 and accompanying text. 
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heretofore been individualized ADA failure to accommodate claims. 
It demonstrated that there is nothing inherent in the doctrines of 
disparate impact and class action precluding their use in disability 
discrimination cases. More importantly, it showed that the theoretical 
basis for aggregating race and sex claims—panethnicity—can and 
should be imported to disability discrimination employment claims. 
Pandisability provides a tool to connect the interests of individuals 
with diverse disabilities. It is the common experience of social 
exclusion and stigma that binds these groups together in real life. It 
should do no less for litigation purposes. 
